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2ABSTRACT:
Plaintiffs who are harassed or otherwise discriminated against in retail stores on 
the basis of their race or national origin have few options for legal redress.  The major 
federal public accommodations statute, Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, does not 
cover retail stores.  In addition, while some state public accommodations statutes 
explicitly ban discrimination in retail stores, many others do not.  As a result, plaintiffs 
who have been discriminated against in retail stores have turned to the contracts clause of 
42 U.S.C. § 1981.  
Section 1981, a Reconstruction-era civil rights statute, guarantees to all people 
within the United States the same right “as is enjoyed by white citizens” to “make and 
enforce contracts.”  Over time, courts have changed the scope of § 1981, variously 
expanding and restricting the statute’s coverage.  In 1991, Congress amended the statute 
to extend its requirement of equality beyond the “making” and “enforcement” of 
contracts to include the “performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the 
enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual 
relationship.”  However, many courts have continued to apply the statute narrowly, 
despite the 1991 amendments that broadened its scope.  
This narrowing of the statute places many clear cases of discrimination by 
retailers outside § 1981’s coverage.  It is wrong as a matter of statutory interpretation and 
contract law.  It is also wrong as a matter of history, at odds with the development of 
property and contract law over time.  
This paper examines and critiques courts’ narrow § 1981 jurisprudence, and offers 
a model for improved § 1981 decision-making.  It argues that the “right to contract” 
protected by § 1981 is a process rather than a moment.  The statute protects the entire 
contractual relationship between customer and store: entering, browsing or sampling the 
goods available, interacting with store personnel, completing a purchase, and finally 
exiting the store.  It also asserts that stores provide services as well as goods, and § 1981 
demands that those services be provided equally to all customers, regardless of their race 
or national origin.  Finally, it argues that § 1981 cannot be interpreted as mandating equal 
access, but then permitting unequal treatment at all points except the checkout counter.  
Congress attempted to broaden § 1981 in 1991 to correct this very mistake in logic; 
today’s courts have continued to interpret the statute, and the retail contracts on which the 
statute pivots, narrowly and improperly. 
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542 U.S.C. § 1981
Equal rights under the law 
(a) Statement of equal rights. All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall 
have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be 
parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the 
security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to 
like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no 
other.
(b) “Make and enforce contracts” defined. For purposes of this section, the term "make 
and enforce contracts" includes the making, performance, modification, and termination 
of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the 
contractual relationship.
(c) Protection against impairment. The rights protected by this section are protected 
against impairment by nongovernmental discrimination and impairment under color of 
State law.
6Part I:  Introduction
On a July Saturday in 2003, Samaad Bishop, an African American, bought a doll 
set for his daughter at a Toys ‘R’  Us store in the Bronx, New York.  As he was leaving 
the store, a security guard approached and asked to see his receipt.  Mr. Bishop initially 
refused, asking why he had to show the receipt.  The guard told him, “store policy,” and 
allegedly went on, “This is the Bronx, not the suburbs and black people steal more than 
whites.”  Mr. Bishop and the guard began to argue, and the guard pushed him back into 
the store.  During the argument, two white women exited the store carrying Toys ‘R’  Us 
bags without being asked to present receipts. Mr. Bishop ultimately called the police 
and, when they arrived at the store, showed them his receipt.  He was then allowed to 
leave.  
Mr. Bishop later sued Toys ‘R’ Us under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which prohibits 
discrimination on the basis of race and national origin in contractual relationships.  He 
lost.  The court found that because Mr. Bishop had already made his purchase, his 
contract with the store was complete, and he had no rights under the statute.  Though Mr. 
Bishop made an adequate showing that the security guard had discriminated against him 
on the basis of his race, whatever harm he suffered fell outside the coverage of § 1981. 1
Theresa McCrea’s § 1981 race discrimination claims against Saks, Inc. met with a 
similar fate.  On Saturday, April 18, 1998, Ms. McCrea, an African American, was 
1 Bishop v. Toys ‘R’ Us-NY, LLC, No. 04-9403, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5009 (S.D.N.Y. 
Feb. 8, 2006).  Mr. Bishop also brought claims under state tort law, as well as under 
another portion of § 1981, the full and equal benefits clause.  In addition, he asserted 
claims arising under 42 U.S.C. § § 1982 and 1983.  Though the court dismissed his § 
1981 contract discrimination claim, Mr. Bishop’s § 1981 full and equal benefits, § 1983, 
and state law claims survived.  The full and equal benefits clause of § 1981 is discussed 
further in Part VII.B.1, infra.
7shopping with her aunt and young daughter at a Saks clothing store in Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania.  A salesman approached her about her young daughter’s behavior, and he 
and Ms. McCrea began to argue.  The salesman then called security, telling them to “Get 
this nigger out.”  Ms. McCrea, her daughter, and her aunt left the store without 
purchasing the shirt they had planned to buy.  
Ms. McCrea sued Saks, Inc. under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.  Like Mr. Bishop, she lost.  
The court, in granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss, reasoned that, because the store 
did not outright refuse to sell the shirt to Ms. McCrea, it did not infringe on any right 
protected by § 1981.  Though Ms. McCrea made allegations that the salesman had 
discriminated against her and her family on the basis of their race, because they were 
merely “harassed and discouraged,” they could not claim the statute’s protection.2
In Bishop and McCrea, the plaintiffs were accused and harassed because they are 
African American.  They were treated differently from the white customers around them, 
who were able to exit Toys ‘R’ Us without having to call the police and shop at Saks 
without being assailed with racial epithets.  However, customers like Mr. Bishop and the 
McCrea family who have experienced discrimination because of their race or national 
origin in retail stores have few options for legal redress. 3  The major federal public 
2
 McCrea v. Saks, Inc., No. 00-1936, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18990 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 2, 
2000).  Ms. McCrea also sued Saks under Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 
state tort law.  Like her § 1981 claims, the court dismissed both her Title II and state law 
claims.  
3
 Professor Anne-Marie G. Harris describes these claims by shoppers as “Consumer 
Racial Profiling,” defined as “any type of differential treatment of consumers in the 
marketplace based on race or ethnicity that constitutes a denial or degradation in the 
product or service offered to the consumer.”  She notes that “CRP can take many forms, 
ranging from overt or outright confrontation to very subtle differences in treatment, often 
manifested in forms of harassment.  Outright confrontation includes verbal attacks, such 
as shouting racial epithets, and physical attacks, such as removing customers from the 
8accommodations statute, Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, does not cover retail 
stores.4  In addition, while some state public accommodations statutes explicitly ban 
discrimination in retail stores,5 no such statute exists in Alabama, Florida, Georgia, 
Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Texas.6  Mississippi and South 
Carolina’s laws in fact empower retailers to discriminate among their customers on any 
basis.7  As a result, many plaintiffs who have been discriminated against in retail stores 
have turned to the contracts clause of 42 U.S.C. § 1981.  
store.  Customer harassment includes slow or rude service, required pre-payment, 
surveillance, searches of belongings, and neglect, such as refusing to serve African-
American customers.”  Anne-Marie G. Harris, Shopping While Black: Applying 42 
U.S.C. § 1981 to Cases of Consumer Racial Profiling, 23 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 1, 4 
(2003).
4
 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b) (2005).  
5 See, e.g., Pennsylvania: 43 PA. CONS. STAT. § 954(l) (2005) (“The term ‘public 
accommodation, resort or amusement’ means any accommodation, resort or amusement 
which is open to, accepts or solicits the patronage of the general public, including but not 
limited to . . . retail stores and establishments . . . .”); Ohio: ORC. ANN. 4112.01(9) (2005) 
(“‘Place of public accommodation’ means any inn, restaurant, eating house, barbershop, 
public conveyance by air, land, or water, theater, store, other place for the sale of 
merchandise, or any other place of public accommodation or amusement of which the 
accommodations, advantages, facilities, or privileges are available to the public.”).
6
 Joseph William Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and Private 
Property, 90 NW. U.L. REV. 1283, 1437 (1996).  However, Texas has passed a law 
allowing revocation of a liquor license from a retailer convicted of violating “an 
individual’s civil rights or the discrimination against an individual on the basis of the 
individual's race, color, creed, or national origin.”  TEX. ALCO. BEV. CODE § 11.611 
(2005).
7 S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-11-620 (2005); (“Any person who, without legal cause or good 
excuse, enters into the dwelling house, place of business, or on the premises of another 
person after having been warned not to do so or any person who, having entered into the 
dwelling house, place of business, or on the premises of another person without having 
been warned fails and refuses, without good cause or good excuse, to leave immediately 
upon being ordered or requested to do so by the person in possession or his agent or 
representative shall, on conviction, be fined not more than two hundred dollars or be 
imprisoned for not more than thirty days.”); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-23-17 (2005) (“[A 
retailer] is hereby authorized and empowered to choose or select the person or persons he 
or it desires to do business with, and is further authorized and empowered to refuse to sell 
9Section 1981, a Reconstruction-era civil rights statute, guarantees to all people 
within the United States the same right “as is enjoyed by white citizens” to “make and 
enforce contracts.”  Over time, courts have changed the scope of § 1981, variously 
expanding and restricting the statute’s coverage.  In 1991, Congress amended the statute
to extend its requirement of equality beyond the “making” and “enforcement” of 
contracts to include the “performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the 
enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual 
relationship.”  However, many courts have continued to apply the statute narrowly, 
despite the 1991 amendments that broadened its scope.  
This narrowing has occurred in two ways.  First, some courts have seemed simply 
to ignore the 1991 amendments, continuing to focus solely on § 1981’s “make and 
enforce” clause.  In this view, a shopper can state a claim under § 1981 only if he or she 
is clearly blocked from “making” a contract.  Shoppers who successfully contract with 
retail stores, but on discriminatory terms and conditions, as well as those who are 
deterred, but not completely blocked from purchasing, can claim no § 1981 protection.  
Other courts have made use of § 1981’s clause that prohibits discrimination in a 
contract’s privileges, benefits, terms, and conditions.  However, these courts have 
narrowed the statute in a second way, by accepting as actionable only those privileges, 
benefits, terms, and conditions that have a direct impact on the moment of purchase.  
Retailers’ discriminatory acts against shoppers before or after the exchange of money for 
goods fall outside the statute, and those shoppers are left with no remedy.  
to, wait upon or serve any person that the owner, manager or employee of such public 
place of business does not desire to sell to, wait upon or serve.”).
10
This double-narrowing of the statute— some courts’ confining its coverage to the 
“make and enforce” clause and others’ recognizing only few actionable privileges, 
benefits, terms, and conditions— places many clear cases of discrimination by retailers 
outside § 1981’s coverage.  Among those excluded are cases in which retailers deter 
browsers or potential buyers from purchasing, but do not bar their entry or refuse service 
outright.  In addition, claims of customers who experience discrimination prior to 
purchasing, but who persist and are able to transact successfully, generally cannot stand 
under § 1981.  Finally, cases in which a customer completes his or her transaction, but is 
then discriminated against or harassed as he or she leaves the store, are left out of § 
1981’s coverage.
This paper examines and critiques courts’ narrow § 1981 jurisprudence, and offers 
a model for improved § 1981 decision-making.8  Part II of this paper traces the history 
and amendment of § 1981.  Part III surveys post-1991 §1981 retail store cases, focusing 
on courts’ two ways of narrowing the statute.  Part IV discusses those categories of cases 
left outside § 1981’s protection.  Part V attempts to explain, and then Part VI critiques, 
8
 Other commentators have made similar observations about courts’ application of § 1981 
in retail store cases.  See Abby Morrow Richardson, Applying 42 U.S.C. 1981 to Claims 
of Consumer Discrimination, 39 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 119 (2005); Amanda G. Main, 
Racial Profiling in Places of Public Accommodation: Theories of Recovery and Relief, 39 
BRANDEIS L.J. 289, 307 (2001) (reviewing § 1981 as one of many possible ways to 
address “racial profiling” in retail stores); Deseriee A. Kennedy, Consumer 
Discrimination: The Limitations of Federal Civil Rights Protection, 66 MO. L. REV. 275
(2001) (examining courts’ narrow interpretations of § 1981; focusing also on issues of 
consumer credit and patterns of shopping and consumption); Harris, supra note 5 
(examining § 1981 through the lens of a particular retail store discrimination case); 
Singer, supra note 8 (focusing on the property law implications of § 1981 when applied 
to retail stores; proposing changes to the common law to eliminate retailers’ right to 
exclude). 
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judges’ § 1981 decisions.  Finally, Part VII explores directions for an improved § 1981 
applied to claims of race and national origin discrimination in retail stores.  
Part II: The History and Amendment of § 1981
A. The Origins of § 1981
In December 1865, disturbed by reports that Southern whites were re-creating 
conditions of slavery for newly freed African Americans through “pervasive and 
entrenched private discrimination,”9 Senator Lyman Trumbull of Illinois introduced a bill 
to “grant to the Freedmen basic economic rights— to make and enforce contracts, to sue 
and be sued, and to purchase and lease property.”10  Congress passed the bill as the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866 pursuant to its power to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment’s 
prohibition of slavery or involuntary servitude.  The Act was radical in further extending 
the Thirteenth Amendment’s abolition of slavery into the realm of private economic 
relationships, in compelling whites to “come down and make bargains in good faith”11
and as equals with African American Freedmen.  Indeed, in the view of one member of 
the Congress that passed the 1866 Act, the statute’s reach into this previously-protected 
world of private contractual relations was “absolutely revolutionary.”12
9
 Barry Sullivan, Reconstructing Reconstruction: Historical Reconstruction, 
Reconstruction History, and the Proper Scope of Section 1981, 98 YALE L.J. 541, 552 
(1989).
10 Id. at 550.
11 Id. at 555, n.96 (“The old master was not inclined to treat them differently from what 
he did when they were slaves. . . . The old planters were very unwilling to come down 
and make bargains in good faith.” (citing H.R. REP. NO. 30, 39th Cong. 1st Sess., pt. iv, 
at 116)).
12
 Sullivan, supra note 11, at 547 n.38 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1291 
(1866) (Sen. Morrill)).
12
The language of today’s 42 U.S.C. § 1981 was originally part of Senator 
Trumbull’s Civil Rights Act of 1866.  At the time of its passage, the relevant section of 
the Act read:
[C]itizens of the United States … of every race and color, without regard 
to any previous condition of slavery or involuntary servitude . . .  shall 
have the same right, in every State and Territory in the United States, to 
make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to 
inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, 
and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of 
person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens . . . . 13
In 1870, Congress reenacted this provision of the Act pursuant to the newly-passed 
Fourteenth Amendment.  Congress then split the provision into two sections within the 
Revised Statutes of 1874.14  The clause that became today’s § 1981 concerned the right to 
contract, and read:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same 
right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be 
parties, give evidence, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and 
proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white 
citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, 
licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.
The portion related to real and personal property became the current 42 U.S.C. § 1982, 
and stated:
All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State 
and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, 
lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property. 
13 Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 STAT. 27 (1866) (emphasis added).
14
 Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 424 n.28 (1968).
13
Early cases applied the legislation’s bar on race-based denials of contract and 
property rights to common carriers.  In Coger v. North Western Union Packet Co.,15 the 
Iowa Supreme Court held that the 1866 Act prohibited a steamboat from reserving a first 
class table for white passengers and excluding a female schoolteacher who was one 
quarter African American.16  Discussing the Act, the court commented, “The language is 
comprehensive and includes the right to property and all rights growing out of contracts.  
It includes within its broad terms every right arising in the affairs of life.”17
Similarly, in 1882, in Gray v. Cincinnati S. R. Co.,18 an Ohio court held the “civil 
rights bill” to guarantee to an African American woman the right to a seat in the class of 
train car for which she had bought a ticket.  The plaintiff had purchased a first class 
ticket, but was instead directed to the smoking car.  The court analogized the situation to 
that of a male passenger’s being denied his seat, remarking, “The gentleman's money is 
just as good as the lady's, in the eye of the law, and they are bound to provide for him 
such reasonable accommodations as he has paid and contracted for.”19  With regard to 
the plaintiff herself, the court found that, “Whatever the social relations of life may be, 
before the law we all stand upon the broad plane of equality.  And this company was 
bound to provide for this colored woman precisely such accommodations, in every 
respect, as were provided upon their train for white women.”20
15
 37 Iowa 145 (1873).
16 Id. at 149 (describing the plaintiff’s identity as a “quadroon” and noting that “by her 
spirited resistance and her defiant words, as well as by her pertinacity in demanding the 
recognition of her rights and in vindicating them, she has exhibited evidence of the 
Anglo-Saxon blood that flows in her veins”).
17 Id. at 156 (emphasis added).
18
 11 F. 683 (Ohio, 1882).
19 Id. at 686 (emphasis added).
20 Id.
14
There is also evidence, however, that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was limited in 
its ability to reach far into the realm of private economic choice.  After the Civil Rights 
Cases21 invalidated a separate federal public accommodations law in 1883, courts’ 
interpretations of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 became correspondingly narrow.  For 
example, in Bowlin v. Lyon,22 the Supreme Court of Iowa upheld the right of skating rink 
owners to refuse to sell a ticket to an African American man on the basis of his race, 
despite advertisements that the rink was open to the public:
The act complained of by plaintiff was the withdrawal by defendants as to 
him of the offers which they had made to admit him, or to contract with 
him, for admission. They had the right to do this as to him, or any other 
members of the public. This right, as we have seen, is not based upon the 
fact that he belongs to a particular race, but arises from the consideration 
that neither he, nor any other person, could demand, as a right under the 
law, that the privilege of entering the place be accorded to him.23
Though the plaintiff’s complaint focused on his right to make a contract, rather 
than his right to enter the skating rink as a place of public accommodation, the 
court imported the narrow reasoning of the Civil Rights Cases and dismissed the 
plaintiff’s contract-based claim.
Thus, while some early courts vigorously enforced § 1981’s guarantee of 
equal contract rights to African Americans, others refused to challenge the very 
private acts of discrimination that had troubled Senator Trumbull.  Despite cases 
like Bowlin, § 1981 remained law, and continued to be a source of protection for 
many African Americans who had been discriminated against by common carriers 
21
 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
22
 67 Iowa 536 (1885).
23 Id. at 540 (emphasis added).
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and in public accommodations.24 However, the question of the statute’s 
revolutionary reach into what had previously been the shielded realm of private 
contractual relations has remained in dispute into modern times.
B. The Modern History of § 1981
The modern history of § 1981 can be traced to a 1968 Supreme Court decision, 
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. While early cases brought pursuant to Senator Trumbull’s 
civil rights act concerned race discrimination on common carriers and in places of public 
accommodation, in Jones, the Court faced the question of whether § 1982, § 1981’s 
companion statute, barred “purely private discrimination” in a white owner’s sale of a 
home to an African American family.25  The Court examined the twin histories of § 1981 
and § 1982, noting Congress’ fear in 1866 that private “custom or prejudice” might 
infringe on African Americans’ property rights.26  The Court determined that § 1982’s 
prohibition of race discrimination in the purchase and sale of real and personal property 
extended to private discriminatory acts.  “We hold that § 1982 bars all racial 
discrimination, private as well as public, in the sale of rental of property, and that the 
statute, thus construed, is a valid exercise of the power of Congress . . . .”27
In 1974, the Court turned from § 1982 to the question of § 1981’s application to 
private acts of discrimination.  In Runyon v. McCrary, African American families sued 
24 See generally Singer, supra note 8, at 1378-82.
25 Jones, 392 U.S. at 419.
26 Id. at 423.
27 Id. at 413.  Note that in Jones, the Court drew authority for its decision from the 
Thirteenth, rather than the Fourteenth Amendment.  “Because we have concluded that the 
discrimination alleged in the petitioners' complaint violated a federal statute that 
Congress had the power to enact under the Thirteenth Amendment, we find it 
unnecessary to decide whether that discrimination also violated the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”  Id. at 413 n.5.
16
whites-only private schools under § 1981, and the schools argued that the statute did not 
apply to private actors.  The Court observed that the schools had advertised and offered 
their services to members of the general public, but then refused to serve white and 
nonwhite students equally.28  Citing Jones, the Runyon Court applied § 1981’s contracts 
clause to the schools’ discriminatory refusal to deal, stating:
The petitioning schools and school association argue principally that § 
1981 does not reach private acts of racial discrimination.  That view is 
wholly inconsistent with Jones’ interpretation of the legislative history of 
§ 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, an interpretation that was 
reaffirmed in [later Supreme Court cases] . . . And this consistent 
interpretation of the law necessarily requires the conclusion that § 1981, 
like § 1982, reaches private conduct.29
By 1974, therefore, the Supreme Court had interpreted both § 1982 and the 
contracts clause of § 1981 broadly, allowing the statute’s protection to reach the 
“pervasive and entrenched private discrimination” that the 1866 Act was written 
to combat.30
C. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union
In 1989, this trend of liberal interpretation of § 1981 and § 1982 came to a halt.  
The Supreme Court decided Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, in which an African 
American employee brought suit under § 1981, claiming that her employer had harassed 
her-- including commenting that “blacks are known to work slower than whites”-- failed 
to promote her, and then terminated her. 31  Though the Court upheld Runyon’s broad 
application of § 1981 to private discriminatory acts, the Court also adopted an extremely 
28
 Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 164-65 (1976).
29 Id. at 173.
30
 Sullivan, supra note 11, at 552.
31
 491 U.S. 164, 178 (1989).
17
narrow view of the phases of the employment relationship covered by the statute.  The 
Court stated:
The most obvious feature of [§ 1981] is the restriction of its scope to 
forbidding discrimination in the “mak[ing] and enforce[ment]” of 
contracts alone.  Where an alleged act of discrimination does not involve 
the impairment of one of these specific rights, §  1981 provides no relief.  
Section 1981 cannot be construed as a general proscription of racial 
discrimination in all aspects of contract relations, for it expressly 
prohibits discrimination only in the making and enforcement of 
contracts.32
According to the Court, the harassment and discrimination that the plaintiff suffered fell 
outside § 1981’s coverage because it took place after the initial formation of the 
employment contract.  In reaching this conclusion, the Court first located a time period in 
which it determined “contract formation” to have occurred, and then drew a bright line 
between the “formation” and “postformation” phases of the employment relationship.  
Relying on this distinction, the Court held: 
[T]he right to make contracts does not extend, as a matter of either logic or 
semantics, to conduct by the employer after the contract relation has been 
established, including breach of the terms of the contract or imposition of 
discriminatory working conditions.  Such postformation conduct does not 
involve the right to make a contract, but rather implicates the performance 
of established contract obligations and the conditions of continuing 
employment . . . .33
Though he concurred with the majority’s upholding of Runyon, Justice Brennan 
dissented vigorously from the majority’s narrow reading of the statute’s coverage.  Joined 
by Justices Marshall and Blackmun and in part by Justice Stevens, Justice Brennan 
attacked the Court’s formalism, accusing the majority of applying the statute in a manner 
32 Id. at 176 (emphasis added).
33 Id. at 177.
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“antithetical to Congress’ vision of a society in which contractual opportunities are 
equal.”34  Rather than ending the § 1981 inquiry at the bright line marking the edge of 
“contract formation,” Justice Brennan viewed discriminatory postformation conduct as 
evidence that the initial contract had been made on unequal terms.35  As an example, he 
offered the scenario of an employer’s extending the same employment contract to African 
American and white applicants, but telling the African American applicant, “there’s a lot 
of harassment going on in this workplace and you have to agree to that.”36  The Patterson
plaintiff, he maintained, suffered the same harm as the fictional African American 
applicant, and “in neither case can it be said that whites and blacks have had the same 
right to make an employment contract.”37
In a footnote, Justice Brennan offered a second way in which postformation 
discriminatory conduct would fall within § 1981’s coverage.  He recognized that 
postformation race discrimination against a contracting party might deter other members 
of that party’s race from even beginning negotiations in the first place.  He stated, 
“[W]hen a person is deterred, because of his race, from even entering negotiations, his 
equal opportunity to contract is denied as effectively as if he were discouraged by an 
offer of less favorable terms.”38
Justice Stevens wrote a separate dissent in which he challenged the notion that an 
employment contract exists only at a single moment and is susceptible to clear 
34 Id. at 189.
35 Id. at 207-08 (“[T]he language of § 1981 is quite naturally read as extending to cover 
postformation conduct that demonstrates that the contract was not really made on equal 
terms at all.”).
36 Id. at 208.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 209.  
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demarcation at its borders.  Noting that an at-will employee is “constantly remaking [his 
or her] contract,” he argued that, “if, after the employment relationship is formed, the 
employer deliberately implements a policy of harassment of black employees, it has 
imposed a contractual term on them that is not the ‘same’ as the contractual provisions 
that ‘are enjoyed by white citizens.’”39  To Stevens, the majority’s view of “contract” as a 
discrete event capable of being pinpointed at one moment in time ignored contracts’ true 
identity as “evidence of a vital, ongoing relationship between human beings.”40  Despite 
the Brennan and Stevens dissents, however, the Patterson majority’s narrow 
interpretation of the statute was binding, and § 1981 could be applied only to 
discrimination that took place at the moment of contract formation. 
D. The Civil Rights Act of 1991
Three years later, with the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress overruled 
Patterson, along with multiple other Supreme Court decisions that had interpreted civil 
rights laws narrowly.41  The Act amended § 1981 to broaden its coverage beyond the 
making and enforcement of contracts, specifically repudiating the Patterson majority’s 
cramped reading of the statute.  Comments from the legislative history of the 1991 Act 
reveal the sentiment that “[t]he Patterson decision [had] sharply cut back on the scope 
and effectiveness of section 1981 … [with] profoundly negative consequences both in the 
39 Id. at 221.
40 Id.
41
 The Civil Rights Act of 1991 overturned six Supreme Court opinions in addition to
Patterson.  Jane Rutherford, The Myth of Due Process, 72 B.U.L. REV. 1, 99 n.96 (1992) 
(listing the cases as Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), Lorance v. 
American Telephone and Telegraph Technologies, 490 U.S. 900 (1989), Martin v. Wilks, 
490 U.S. 755 (1989), Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), West Virginia 
University Hospital v. Casey, 111 S. Ct. 113 (1991), and E.E.O.C. v. Arabian American 
Oil, 111 S. Ct. 1227 (1991)).
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employment context and elsewhere.”42   The report of the Senate Committee on Labor 
and Human Resources identified “a compelling need for legislation to overrule the 
Patterson decision and ensure that federal law prohibits all race discrimination in 
contracts.”43  Congress therefore added subsection (b) to the statute, defining “make and 
enforce contracts” to include “the making, performance, modification, and termination of 
contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the 
contractual relationship.”  Congress also added subsection (c), which states, “The rights 
protected by this section are protected against impairment by nongovernmental 
discrimination and impairment under color of State law.”  This section codified the 
Runyon holding applying § 1981 to acts of private discrimination.  Finally, though not 
explicitly mentioned in the amended statute, Congress approved of a Supreme Court 
decision, St. Francis College v. AlKhazraji,44 which had applied § 1981 not only to race 
discrimination, but to discrimination on the basis of national origin as well.45
Thus, today’s § 1981 is the most recent version of a statute whose interpretation, 
reach, and coverage have changed over time.  Since 1991, the statute as written would 
seem to provide far-reaching protections against private acts of race and national origin 
discrimination in contractual relationships.  Indeed, in a 1994 § 1981 employment case, 
the Supreme Court described the post-1991 amended statute as applying to “all phases 
42 H.R. REP. NO. 102-40(I), at 87, 89 (1991).
43 S. REP. NO. 101-315, at 12-14 (1990).
44
  481 U.S. 604 (1986).
45
 137 CONG. REC. S15472, S15486 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991) (Statement of Rep. 
DeConcini) (“The Court in St. Francis College demonstrated that when Congress enacted 
this statute it intended to protect from discrimination a wide variety of groups that were 
then considered racial groups but are now considered national origin or ethnic minority 
groups. Characteristics that identify national origin groups are ethnic characteristics such 
as language, speech accent, culture, ancestry, birthplace, and certain physical 
characteristics.”).
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and incidents of the contractual relationship . . . .”46  Yet despite Congress’ broadening of 
the statute, many courts continue to apply it narrowly in cases of discrimination in retail 
stores, focusing only on the “make and enforce” clause or limiting the actionable 
privileges, benefits, terms, and conditions to those that have a direct impact on the 
moment of purchase.47
Part III:  Courts’ Double-Narrowing of § 1981
A. The Conception of Contract in Post-1991 § 1981 Retail Store Cases
Before examining the post-1991 cases in which courts have narrowed § 1981, it is 
important to note the conception of contract that lies beneath those courts’ restricted 
readings of the statute.  The right to equal treatment that § 1981 confers is not free-
standing, but rather tied to an underlying contractual relationship.  Courts’ view of that 
underlying contract therefore influences their § 1981 jurisprudence.  Though very few 
courts actually engage with contract law in their § 1981 retail store decisions, one can 
imagine courts’ asking two preliminary questions at the outset of their § 1981 analyses: 
When is a retail contract made, and what is a retail contract for?  
In response to the first question, a court could mark the beginning of the retail 
contractual relationship at multiple points.  The relationship might be created by a 
shopper’s entry into a retail store, signifying his or her “acceptance” of the store’s “offer” 
46
 Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 306-07 (1994).
47
 One court summarized this narrow approach as follows: “Courts, including this one, 
that have examined discrimination in the retail context under §  1981 have focused on the 
question of whether a plaintiff's right to contract has been impeded, thwarted, or deterred 
in some way, . . .  or whether special conditions have been placed on a plaintiff's right to 
contract.”  Baltimore-Clark v. Kinko’s, Inc., 270 F. Supp. 2d 695, 699 (D. Md. 2003) 
(internal citations omitted).
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of goods.  Alternatively, the contractual relationship might begin when a customer locates 
the item for which he or she was looking, and end when he or she purchases those goods.  
In § 1981 retail cases, however, courts have almost universally defined the 
contractual relationship between customer and retailer as both beginning and ending with 
the exchange of money for goods.  Retail contracts come to resemble the Patterson
majority’s discrete, cabined employment contract, rather than Justice Stevens’ “vital, 
ongoing relationship between human beings.”48  As the Fifth Circuit has stated, “A 
contract for employment involves a continuing contractual relationship that lasts for the 
duration of the agreement . . . In the retail context, by contrast, there is no continuing 
contractual relationship. Instead, the relationship is based on a single discrete 
transaction--the purchase of goods.”49 The contract is a moment, rather than a process, 
and a contract’s “making” and “enforcement” happen simultaneously at the point of 
purchase.  As a result, when post-1991 courts limit § 1981’s coverage to contracts’ 
“making” and “enforcement,” they also confine its protections to the point of purchase, 
the moment when a customer exchanges money for goods and the contract is both made 
and enforced.
Courts have answered the second question— a retail contract’s content— by 
refusing to view the contract as a bargain for much more than the goods sold.  In other 
types of § 1981 case, such as claims brought against restaurants, courts have read the 
contract as encompassing service as well as goods.  In the retail store context, though 
some courts have recognized that § 1981’s subsection (b) requires equality in a retail 
48 Patterson, 491 U.S. at 221.
49 Arguello v. Conoco, Inc., 330 F.3d 355, 360 (5th Cir. 2003).
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contract’s privileges, benefits, terms, and conditions, this recognition has not translated 
into a consideration of many terms and conditions— quality of customer service provided 
to African American versus white customers, for example— beyond the goods 
purchased.  Instead, courts have generally accepted only those privileges, benefits, terms, 
and conditions that are tightly linked to the point of purchase, and have refused to 
examine service provided before or after that moment.  Given the option to view service
as well as goods as part of a retail contract, courts have adopted a limited view of the 
contracts’ content, confining the bargain to the goods exchanged for money.  
The two ways in which courts have narrowed § 1981— focusing exclusively on 
the “make and enforce” clause and acknowledging only a few actionable privileges, 
benefits, terms, and conditions— are thus based on a correspondingly limited view of the 
duration and content of the contract between customer and retailer.  An examination of 
courts’ post-1991 § 1981 jurisprudence reveals both courts’ double-narrowing of the 
statute and the restricted view of retail contracts on which it is based.
B. The “Make and Enforce” Clause
Post-1991 courts’ first method of narrowing § 1981 has been to limit its coverage 
to only the “making” and “enforcement” of contracts.  For these courts, a successful 
§ 1981 claim must involve the complete denial of a shopper’s right to “make” a contract 
in the form of a retailer’s outright refusal to deal.  In retail settings, an outright refusal 
comes in several forms: a store’s barring a customer’s entry, asking a customer to leave, 
or refusing to complete a customer’s transaction at or near the checkout counter.  In the 
pre-1991 Patterson-era, this type of claim represented the archetypal § 1981 retail store 
case, and courts easily identified violations of those customers’ rights to “make and 
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enforce” retail contracts.50  Because the pre-1991 statute contained no “privileges, 
benefit, terms, and conditions” language, the statute’s protection was also limited to those 
core cases.  In 1991, Congress broadened the statute by prohibiting discrimination in 
contracts’ privileges, benefits, terms, and conditions.  Yet despite the 1991 amendments, 
some courts have continued to limit the statute’s coverage to cases involving outright 
refusals to deal.  This narrowing of the statute is evident in courts’ reasons for dismissing 
some § 1981 cases and for letting others stand, policing the boundaries of this “core” 
category of cases. 
The Fifth and Seventh Circuits, for example, have dismissed § 1981 retail store 
cases on the ground that the plaintiffs, though clearly discriminated against on the basis 
of their race or national origin, failed to show that retailers had blocked them from 
“making” or “enforcing” their contracts.  In Arguello v. Conoco,51 the Fifth Circuit 
required Latino plaintiffs who had successfully purchased gas, but then abandoned an 
attempt to purchase beer when a clerk addressed them with racial epithets, to show that 
they were actually “thwarted” from contracting, rather than merely deterred.  The court 
identified a “rule” in the Fifth Circuit that, “where a customer has engaged in an actual 
attempt to contract that was thwarted by the merchant, courts have been willing to 
50
 An example of a pre-1991 core § 1981 case is Watson v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 
915 F.2d 235 (6th Cir. 1990), in which African Americans were ejected from a club and 
told that the bartenders would not serve them.  The court viewed the case as one of 
outright refusal to contract in the form of a request to leave the premises.  Similarly, in 
Washington v. Duty Free Shoppers, 710 F.Supp 1288 (N.D. Cal. 1988), a retailer told 
African American plaintiffs, falsely, that the store was closed or that they had to have an 
airline ticket to enter.  Though the decision contains no § 1981 analysis, and focuses 
instead on the question of whether the retailer’s actions were discriminatory, the court 
denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss, thereby implicitly accepting the plaintiffs’ 
claim of a core § 1981 violation in the store’s blocking of their entry.
51
 330 F.3d 355 (5th Cir. 2003).
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recognize a § 1981 claim.”52  Because the court found that the Arguello plaintiffs bought 
gas and then “voluntarily” abandoned the beer purchase, they could not make the core 
showing of an outright refusal to contract.     
The Seventh Circuit dismissed a similar § 1981 retail store case in Morris v. 
Office Max, Inc.53  The court’s reasoning shows that it shared the Fifth Circuit’s view of 
the core and limits of the statute’s coverage.  In Office Max, police officers questioned 
African American customers regarding stolen items, remarking that the plaintiffs were 
“guilty by association,” allegedly referring to their race.  The court rejected the plaintiffs’ 
claims, explaining that the plaintiffs “were neither denied admittance nor service, nor 
were they asked to leave the store.”54  As illustrated by Arguello and Office Max, even 
after 1991, courts have continued to define as the extent of § 1981’s protections its “make 
and enforce” clause, violated only by a retailer’s outright refusal to deal.  
Courts’ narrowing of the statute is evident not only in the cases of plaintiffs who 
lose, but also in courts’ reasons for allowing other claims to stand.  Though these 
plaintiffs’ § 1981 claims are successful, the courts deciding their cases have employed a 
narrow § 1981 analysis quite similar to that in Arguello and Office Max.  The plaintiffs 
may win, but only because they are able to state a claim that falls within the courts’ 
limited view of the statute.  Though not a retail store case, an example is Causey v. Sewell 
Cadillac-Chevrolet, Inc.,55 in which an African American was refused service on his car 
and told, “Niggers always want something for nothing.”  Relying on the Arguello court’s 
interpretation of the limits of § 1981, the Fifth Circuit characterized the plaintiff’s claim 
52 Id. at 358.  
53
 89 F.3d 411, 414 (7th Cir. 1996).
54 Id. at 413.
55
 394 F.3d 285, 287 (5th Cir. 2004).
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as a classic § 1981 violation, a situation in which “a merchant denies service or outright 
refuses to engage in business with a consumer attempting to contract with the 
merchant.”56  Similarly, in Christian v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,57 the plaintiff, an African 
American, was accused of shoplifting and asked to leave a store by police, requiring her 
to abandon a shopping cart full of merchandise.  The Sixth Circuit concluded that the 
plaintiff “had selected merchandise to purchase, had the means to complete the 
transaction, and would, in fact, have completed her purchase had she not been asked to 
leave the store.”58  On this ground, the court allowed her § 1981 claim to stand, 
remarking that the case “involve[d] none of the difficulties that other courts have 
encountered in determining whether there was a valid contract interest at stake.”59
This narrowed application of § 1981 is evident in two final district court cases in 
which the plaintiffs succeeded in making out core § 1981 claims.  In Burgin v. Toys-R-
Us,60 the plaintiffs alleged that a store clerk verbally harassed them at the check-out 
counter and returned the money they had already tendered.  A security guard then 
removed them from the store and remarked, “See, that's why I don't like those niggers.”61
In denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss, the court stated, “[T]he instant plaintiffs 
have alleged that they were denied the right to purchase goods— i.e., to make a 
contract— because they are black; moreover, they allege that [the guard] referred to them 
as ‘niggers.’  It is difficult— and unnecessary— to imagine more specific allegations 
56 Id. at 290 (emphasis added).
57
 252 F.3d 862 (6th Cir. 2001).
58 Id. at 874.
59 Id. 
60
 No. 97-CV-0998E, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10073 (W.D.N.Y. June 30, 1999).
61 Id. at *3.
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under the circumstances.”62  The court viewed Burgin as presenting a classic case of a § 
1981 violation: an outright refusal to deal on a race-discriminatory basis.  Likewise, in 
Shen v. A&P Food Stores,63 the plaintiffs alleged that a retailer refused to sell them 
groceries because they were Chinese American, shouting “Go back to China.”  The court 
found that the plaintiffs had stated a cognizable § 1981 claim, holding that “the refusal to 
sell groceries is a denial of the right to enter into a contract.”
These courts have seemed to ignore Congress’ addition of subsection (b) to the 
statute.  Indeed, the plaintiffs in Arguello and Office Max might have made successful 
claims that their retail contracts contained inferior and unequal privileges, benefits, terms, 
and conditions, in violation of subsection (b).64  However, these courts have disregarded 
the statute’s expanded form, clinging to a pre-1991 view of the core and limits of the 
statute’s coverage.  For plaintiffs whose claims fall within that core, who have 
experienced a retailer’s outright refusal to deal, courts have usually interpreted § 1981 to 
provide protection, as illustrated by Causey, Christian, Burgin, and Shen.  As in Arguello
and Office Max, however, for many plaintiffs who cannot show a discriminatory outright 
refusal, courts’ adherence to this view of § 1981’s core and failure to engage with 
subsection (b) have removed any opportunity for redress under the statute.    
62 Id. at *7.
63
 No. 93 CV 1184, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21404 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 1995).
64
 Though it is possible that the plaintiffs in these cases did not plead that the retailer 
violated subsection (b) of § 1981, courts would not be bound by this omission, as 
subsection (b), as written, is a definition of the term “make and enforce contracts” in 
subsection (a).  Courts would therefore be free to draw on subsection (b) in their 
analyses, and would not be limited by plaintiffs’ deficient pleadings.  
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C. The “Privileges, Benefits, Terms, and Conditions” Clause
Though some courts have limited § 1981’s reach to cases in which plaintiffs have 
been blocked from “making” contracts, ignoring subsection (b), others have accepted as 
additional § 1981 violations situations in which a contract is formed, but with unequal 
privileges, benefits, terms, or conditions.  Examples of cases in this category include 
customers who have been required to pre-pay or pay by certain methods, addressed with 
racial slurs at the point of purchase, and arrested by police during a transaction.  These 
customers all complete their purchases, and are therefore not blocked from “making” and 
“enforcing” a retail contract.  Because the contractual moment is altered on the basis of 
race or national origin, however, courts have been willing to find violations of § 1981.  
Though at first glance these courts seem to be widening the reach of § 1981 beyond those 
cases summarized above, their analyses in fact represent a second narrowing of the 
statute, for the terms, conditions, privileges, and benefits they have recognized are few, 
limited only to those discriminatory acts that have a direct impact on the contractual 
moment.    
An example of such a case is Hill v. Shell Oil Co.,65 in which African American, 
but not white, customers were required to pre-pay for gasoline.  In refusing to dismiss the
plaintiffs’ case, the court explicitly rejected the defendant’s attempts to confine § 1981’s 
protections to refusal-to-deal cases.  Foreshadowing the Fifth Circuit’s Arguello decision, 
the defendant argued that “because plaintiffs were admitted into the gas stations and 
ultimately were able to purchase gas, there has been no tangible deprivation of rights 
65 78 F. Supp. 2d 764 (N.D. Ill. 1999).
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protected by § 1981….”66  The court held to the contrary, that the discriminatory pre-
payment requirement “adversely affected the basic terms and conditions of [the 
plaintiffs’] contract to purchase gasoline from Shell-brand stations.”67  Essential to the 
court’s analysis was the timing of the discrimination “at the point of sale, directly 
implicating plaintiffs' right to contract and to enjoy ‘all benefits, privileges, terms, and 
conditions of the contractual relationship.’”68  The court therefore recognized a § 1981 
violation in the imposition of discriminatory contractual terms and conditions.  However, 
the court still narrowed its analysis, tethering the terms and conditions claim to the 
conception of a retail contract as existing only at a moment, “at the point of sale.”69
In Buchanan v. Consolidated Stores Corp.,70 the court accepted as actionable 
similar discrimination at the point of sale.  In that case, a chain of toy stores maintained a 
policy of refusing African American customers’ personal checks.  The court held that, 
though the plaintiffs were ultimately successful in making purchases, the no-check policy 
violated § 1981’s terms and conditions clause.  Analogizing the case to Hill v. Shell Oil 
Co., the court stated, “the defendants placed a special condition on Plaintiffs’ right to 
contract . . . Further, both sets of plaintiffs alleged that the respective defendants’ 
discriminatory policies adversely affected the basic terms and conditions of their contract 
to purchase merchandise.”71
66 Id. at 777.
67 Id. (emphasis added).
68 Id. (emphasis added).
69
 Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification was granted in this case on March 28, 2002.  
Hill v. Shell Oil Co., No. 98 C 5766, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13396 (D. Ill. March 28, 
2002).  
70 125 F. Supp. 2d 730 (D. Md. 2001).
71 Id. at 736 (emphasis added).  The Buchanan court later granted summary judgment to 
the defendants on the ground that they had advanced a legitimate nondiscriminatory 
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Though it did not involve a retail store, Hill v. Kookies, Inc.,72 represents another 
privileges, benefits, terms, and conditions case.  In Hill, African Americans were required 
to pay a $13.00 cover price to gain entry to a bar, while white patrons were charged only 
$3.00.73  Though the bulk of the opinion concerns the question of whether race 
discrimination existed, the court allowed the plaintiffs’ § 1981 claim to stand, perhaps 
because the discriminatory pricing scheme altered contractual moment itself, the 
exchange of money for entry.
By recognizing privileges, benefits, terms, and conditions in addition to core 
refusal-to-deal claims under § 1981, these courts seem to be engaging with subsection (b) 
of § 1981 and reading the statute more broadly.  However, it is important to recognize 
that each successful § 1981 claim in this category stems from a discriminatory privilege, 
benefit, term, or condition that is tightly linked to the contractual moment, the “point of 
sale,” in the words of the Hill v. Shell Oil Co. court.  Beneath these courts’ analyses is an 
idea of contract as a discrete moment or “point” rather than Justice Stevens’ “ongoing 
relationship.”74  As a result, discrimination that occurs outside the contractual moment is 
left without remedy under § 1981.  In effect, this narrow § 1981 creates areas of 
immunity for retailers in which race and national origin discrimination is permitted and 
protected.    
reason for their no-check policy and that the plaintiffs had failed to show that this reason 
was pretextual.  Buchanan v. Consol. Stores Corp., 217 F.R.D. 178 (D. Md. 2003).
72
 No. 97 C 6723, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12276 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 4, 1999).
73 Id. at *2-*3.
74 Patterson, 491 U.S. at 221.
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Part IV:  Categories of Cases Excluded from § 1981’s Coverage 
Courts’ double-narrowing of § 1981, either by limiting the statute’s protection to 
the making and enforcement of contracts or by recognizing only privileges, benefits, 
terms, and conditions that implicate the moment of contract, leaves three categories of 
cases outside the statute’s coverage.  First are those in which browsers are discriminated 
against or potential customers are deterred, but not entirely blocked, from purchasing.  
Second are those in which customers experience discrimination or harassment by retailers 
prior to transacting, but then persevere and successfully make a purchase.  Third are those 
in which customers purchase from a retail store, but then are discriminated against after 
the purchase is complete.  Even when a retailer does not contest a plaintiff’s allegations 
of race discrimination, courts have adhered to their narrow construction of § 1981 in 
these cases and refused to extend the statute’s protection.  
A. Browsers and Potential Customers
The view of § 1981 as limited to the “make and enforce” clause— and violations 
of the statute as consisting only of retailers’ outright refusals to deal— denies § 1981 
relief to browsers and potential customers who are discriminated against in retail stores. 
Courts have rejected these § 1981 claims in two ways.  First, courts have dismissed 
browsers’ claims on the ground that they cannot show an intent to purchase, and therefore 
no right to “make” a contract with which a retailer has interfered.  Alternatively, courts 
have analyzed claims by browsers as if the plaintiffs were asserting an open-ended right 
to make future contracts, and arguing that present discrimination by stores has deterred 
them or others from entering into these future contracts.  Though Justice Brennan 
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suggested this very reading of § 1981 in his Patterson dissent, courts have not recognized 
such a right under § 1981, and have therefore dismissed browsers’ claims.75
Second, courts have rejected claims by potential customers who intend to make a 
purchase and are discriminatorily deterred, but not clearly asked to leave or completely 
denied service.  Courts in these cases differentiate between retailers’ outright refusals to 
deal and forms of deterrence that fall somewhere below that level.  As in Arguello, any 
hint that a customer voluntarily departed a store or abandoned his or her purchase attempt 
defeats his or her § 1981 claim.  Because these plaintiffs cannot show an intent to 
purchase, or because they can show only a retailer’s deterrence, but not denial, courts 
have dismissed their § 1981 claims.  
Courts’ treatment of browsers’ § 1981 claims is illustrated in Turner v. Fashion 
Bug,76 in which the Sixth Circuit denied the claim of an African American man who was 
browsing for Mother’s Day gift ideas for his wife.  A store clerk accused the plaintiff of 
shoplifting and carrying a gun and called the police, who ultimately arrested the plaintiff 
for disorderly conduct.77  The Sixth Circuit dismissed the plaintiff’s case, reasoning:
[The plaintiff] had nothing in hand that he intended to purchase, and had 
nothing in particular in mind that he intended to buy. The fact that Turner 
may have made a purchase if he had found something he wanted to buy 
does not amount to a present intent to enter into a contract.78
The absence of an intent to purchase doomed the plaintiff’s § 1981 case, converting it, in 
the court’s eyes, to a non-actionable claim for a future contract.  In addition, though the 
75 Id. at 209 (“[W]hen a person is deterred, because of his race, from even entering 
negotiations, his equal opportunity to contract is denied as effectively as if he were 
discouraged by an offer of less favorable terms.”).
76
 No. 99-3174, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 32576 (6th Cir. Dec. 9 1999) (unpublished).
77 Id. at *4.
78 Id. at *6-*7.
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court might have viewed the retailer’s accusations of shoplifting and calling the police as 
a refusal to deal, regardless of the plaintiff’s intent to purchase, it did not do so, and 
upheld dismissal of the plaintiff’s claim.    
Claims under § 1981 by browsers have met with a similar fate in the Fifth Circuit. 
In Morris v. Dillard’s Dept. Stores, Inc.,79 a case that would seem to fall squarely within 
§ 1981’s “make and enforce” clause, a retail store accused a customer of shoplifting, had 
her arrested, and then banned her from returning.  Though by banning the customer, the 
store in effect refused service to her on all future occasions, the court denied her § 1981 
claim.  The court required the plaintiff to show “evidence of some tangible attempt to 
contract with Dillard’s during the course of the ban, which could give rise to a contractual 
duty between her and the merchant, and which was in some way thwarted.”80  The court 
thus viewed the plaintiff during the ban as a mere browser, not blocked from entering the 
store in violation of § 1981 but rather only able to assert a non-actionable claim to future 
contracts.  
Courts’ rejection of § 1981 claims by potential customers who intend to purchase
specific items, but are deterred from doing so, has been similar, and is evident in two 
district court opinions.  In Sterling v. Kazmierczak, 81 the plaintiff, an African American, 
entered a Sportmart store with his father, looking for air rifle cartridges.  Before he 
located the cartridges, a security guard accused him of stealing the Nike Jordan sneakers
he was wearing.  The guard ignored Mr. Sterling’s explanation that he had bought the 
shoes four days earlier at a different store, and that he had the receipt.  Instead, the guard 
79 277 F.3d 743 (5th Cir. 2001).
80 Id. at 752.
81 983 F. Supp. 1186, 1192 (D. Ill. 1997).
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took the shoes from Mr. Sterling’s feet and called the police.  Mr. Sterling was ultimately 
arrested and charged with retail theft, but was found not guilty.   
Mr. Sterling sued the Sportmart store under § 1981, but lost.  The court dismissed 
his claim, finding that because Mr. Sterling had not located the air rifle cartridges, he had 
not shown that he was actually going to contract with the store.  Though Mr. Sterling 
made an adequate showing that the security guard had discriminated against him on the 
basis of his race,82 whatever harm he suffered fell outside the coverage of § 1981.83
Likewise, in Evans v. Harry’s Hardware,84 a retailer won on summary judgment, 
defeating the plaintiff’s argument that she was prevented from purchasing goods on the 
basis of her race.  Characterizing her claim as one of a right to a future contract, the court 
dismissed the plaintiff’s claim, stating that “bare allegations of a ‘deterrence’ from 
purchasing goods, ‘constructive refusal’ of service, or interference with a prospective 
contractual relation (without the allegation of an actual loss of a contractual interest) are 
speculative and insufficient to state a claim under § 1981.”85
A review of § 1981 claims by browsers and potential customers reveals only one 
in which the plaintiff was successful.  In Ackerman v. Food-4-Less,86 the court refused to 
dismiss the § 1981 claim of an African American plaintiff who was accused of 
shoplifting in a grocery store, detained for over two hours by store security guards, and 
addressed with racial slurs.  The court rejected the defendant’s argument that the plaintiff 
had not stated an actionable § 1981 claim because she had demonstrated no intent to 
82 Id. at 1191 (“Plaintiffs have also alleged sufficiently that Cairo had an intent to 
discriminate against Sterling Jr. on the basis of race.”).
83 Id. at 1192.  
84
 No. 01-1276, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16606 (E.D. La. Oct. 5, 2001).
85 Id. at *5.
86
 No. 98-CV-1011, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8813 (E.D. Pa. June 10, 1998).
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purchase groceries, specifically a packet of spice powder she had picked from a shelf.  
The court stated: 
The purpose of going to a grocery store is to buy groceries. The purpose of 
picking an item off the shelf at a grocery store is so one may buy it.  We feel that 
it is a very reasonable inference that Plaintiff picked up the Spanish spice powder 
so that she could purchase the seasoning. Therefore, Defendant's argument that 
Plaintiff’s mere act of picking up the spice is not evidence enough of her intent to 
form a contract fails.87
Despite this seemingly expansive reading of § 1981, however, the court then remarked 
that if the plaintiff, after being released from the guard’s detention, had successfully 
purchased from the store, her § 1981 claim would fail, as her contract rights would not 
have been violated.88
Thus, courts almost universally refuse to recognize the § 1981 claims of 
browsers— those with no intent to purchase— and potential customers— those who are 
deterred, but not blocked, from purchasing.  By adhering to a narrow view of § 1981 as 
protecting only the “making” and “enforcement” of contracts, courts limit the statute’s 
coverage, denying relief to this set of plaintiffs who have clearly experienced 
discrimination at retailers’ hands.
B. Pre-purchase Discrimination
The second category of cases excluded from § 1981’s protections are those in 
which customers are discriminated against prior to purchasing, but are nevertheless able 
to complete their transaction.  Typical cases include those in which plaintiffs are 
discriminatorily followed, stopped while shopping, and questioned about their activities.  
With few exceptions, courts have refused to extend § 1981’s protections to these cases, 
87 Id. at *8-*9.
88 Id. at *9.
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reasoning that, because the plaintiffs are ultimately able to make a purchase, their 
contract rights are not impaired.
In dismissing these cases of pre-purchase discrimination, courts have effectively 
picked and chosen which privileges, benefits, terms, and conditions they deem actionable 
under § 1981.  Indeed, one could argue that a customer’s being forced to accept the 
“condition” of being trailed through a store because of his or her race before completing a 
purchase appears clearly to be a violation of § 1981’s “terms and conditions” clause.  
However, because these forms of discrimination do not occur at the moment of purchase, 
and because the plaintiffs are able to complete their transactions, courts have dismissed 
their claims.  In the background of these analyses, courts seem to be adhering to a vision 
of the core § 1981 case as a refusal to “make” a contract, and a narrow idea of a retail 
contract’s duration and content.
In a typical pre-purchase discrimination case, Jeffery v. Home Depot,89 an African 
American plaintiff was in the process of paying for a deadbolt lock when the store clerk 
asked to see what was inside the plaintiff’s bag.  The plaintiff refused, and, after a 
discussion with the clerk’s supervisor, purchased the lock and left the store.  The court 
held that the plaintiff “suffered no actual loss of a contract interest.  While Jeffery's 
purchase of the deadbolt was delayed by the search request, no search ever took place. 
Jeffery eventually purchased the deadbolt and left the store unhindered.  He was not 
denied service or detained.”90  The court went on to note that, though the issue of the 
clerk’s racially discriminatory intent was in dispute, “even if the search request was  
racially motivated, § 1981 would still not provide a statutory basis for a remedy in this 
89 90 F. Supp. 2d 1066 (S.D. Ca. 2000).
90 Id. at 1069.
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case because Jeffery cannot prove interference with a contract right.”91  The court’s 
reference to the fact that the plaintiff “was not denied service” points to the persistence of 
the background idea that the core § 1981 case is an outright refusal to deal.  Because 
Jeffery did not fall into that category, and because the request to look in the plaintiff’s 
bag and delay in service were not linked tightly enough to the contractual moment, the 
claim failed.
Though the defendant was a bank rather than a retail store, Lewis v. Commerce 
Bank & Trust,92 is similar.  An African American attempting to cash his student loan 
check was required to complete his transaction in the bank’s lobby rather than at the 
drive-through window.  After the plaintiff cashed his check, the bank circulated to other 
branches a video of the plaintiff’s transaction and a memorandum describing him as a 
likely bank robber.  The court concluded, however, that the plaintiff failed to state a § 
1981 claim, holding:
[A] delay in cashing checks and a request that plaintiff complete the 
transaction in the bank lobby as opposed to the drive-through facility do 
not appear to deprive a person of the benefits, privileges, terms and 
conditions of a contractual relationship with the bank for the purposes of § 
1981.93
Because the plaintiff was able to complete a contract with the bank, he could make no 
claim under § 1981.  In the eyes of the court, mere delay in his transaction, even if on the 
91 Id.
92
 No. 03-4218, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6477 (D. Kansas March 15, 2004).
93 Id. at *10.
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basis of race, did not rise to the level of a discriminatory term or condition, and did not 
trigger § 1981’s protections.94
Interestingly, some courts have found that a racially-motivated delay in a 
transaction does give rise to a § 1981 claim.  Unlike in Jeffery and Lewis, these courts 
have been willing to categorize cases of pre-purchase discrimination as actionable § 1981 
claims, recognizing that delay, if made on the ground of race, might represent a term or 
condition imposed on whites and non-whites unequally.  In another bank case, Allen v. 
U.S. Bancorp,95 an African American business account holder was required to remove his 
sunglasses and wait in the line for personal, rather than business, accounts.  In its opinion, 
the court recognized that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 expanded the scope of § 1981, and 
reasoned:
While the outright denial of services is certainly a sufficient basis for 
finding a § 1981 violation, it is not a necessary condition under the 
statutory scheme Congress outlined in the Civil Rights Act of 1991.  A 
logical extension of defendant's reasoning would allow a restaurant to 
utilize segregated seating and not offend § 1981.  African American 
patrons could still enjoy the “fundamental characteristic of the contractual 
relationship” because they would “get their meal,” albeit in a segregated 
setting.  Similarly, under defendant's scheme, a store patron told to wait in 
a longer line reserved for people of color would have no claim because he 
or she would eventually be able to purchase the item after enduring race-
based delay and harassment.96
The court recognized the required removal of sunglasses as an “additional restriction” on 
African American, but not white, customers.  “By imposing additional restrictions in 
order to receive service, defendant offered plaintiff different ‘terms and conditions of the 
94 Id. at *6 (“It is not alleged that racial profiling or racially motivated surveillance 
interfered with defendant's ability to make and enforce contracts.”).
95
 264 F. Supp. 2d 945, 948 (D. Or. 2003).
96 Id. at 949.
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contractual relationship’ because of his race.”97  The court identified his having to change 
lines as another such “additional restriction.”  “By requiring plaintiff to wait in a separate 
line because of his race, defendant explicitly denied plaintiff the benefit of timely service 
enjoyed by other customers.”98  Unlike the Jeffery and Lewis courts, the Allen court was 
willing to accept the plaintiff’s § 1981 terms and conditions claims, though they went 
beyond the few— differential pricing and payment schemes— recognized by other 
courts.  
Williams v. Cloverleaf Farms Dairy,99 provides a final example of a court’s 
willingness to view pre-purchase discrimination as actionable, thereby extending § 
1981’s protections to more plaintiffs who have been discriminated against in retail stores.  
In Williams, the African American plaintiff attempted to make a purchase from a 
convenience store cashier.  That cashier made racial slurs and refused service.100  After 
some delay, a second cashier completed the sale.  The court held that the combination of 
the delay and the racial slurs constituted an alteration in the contract’s terms and 
conditions sufficient to give rise to a § 1981 claim.101
The First Circuit has summed up the confusion among courts surrounding this 
issue of defining the reach of § 1981’s “privileges, benefits, terms, and conditions” 
language.  In dicta in Garrett v. Tandy Corp.,102 Judge Selya explained:
97 Id.
98 Id. at 950.
99
 78 F. Supp. 2d 479 (D. Md. 1999).
100 Id. at 482-83.
101 Id. at 485 (“Although Williams was eventually able to purchase items from another 
cashier, the Court refuses to find that this delay in completing the transaction, coupled 
with the alleged racial attack, is insufficient as a matter of law to establish a violation of § 
1981.”).
102
 295 F.3d 94 (1st Cir. 2002).
40
Of course, section 1981, like many laws, is more easily interpreted at the 
polar extremes. The statute applies, for example, if a store refuses, on 
race-based grounds, to permit a customer to purchase its wares. By the 
same token, it does not apply if no contractual relationship is ever 
contemplated by either party (say, if a store manager makes a racially 
insensitive comment to a fireman who responds to a false alarm). The 
harder cases occupy the middle ground: cases in which a contract was 
made and the alleged discrimination bears some relation to it… 
Particularly after the passage of the 1991 amendment, such situations call 
for careful line-drawing, case by case.103
In this case by case analysis, it is likely that those courts who adhere to a “contractual 
moment” view of retail contracts and define § 1981 as consisting only of the “make and 
enforce” clause will interpret § 1981 as in Jeffery and Lewis, while those who take a more 
expansive view of the statute will come out closer to Allen and Williams.  
C. Post-purchase Discrimination
The third and final category of cases excluded from § 1981’s coverage includes 
claims by plaintiffs who successfully purchase from a retail store, but are then harassed 
or mistreated on the basis of race or national origin after their transaction is complete.  
Using largely the same reasoning as in pre-purchase discrimination cases, courts 
confronted with cases in this category have nearly universally declined to extend 
§ 1981’s coverage, maintaining that the customer’s rights vis-à-vis the store end with the 
completion of the purchase.  These cases are analytically most analogous to the Patterson
majority, in which the court rested its opinion on the idea that “the right to make 
contracts does not extend, as a matter of either logic or semantics, to conduct by the 
employer after the contract relation has been established . . . .”104  Despite Congress’ 
1991 overruling of Patterson, many courts have continued to follow the Patterson
103 Id. at 101 (emphasis added).
104 Patterson, 491 U.S. at 177.
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majority, deciding that once the purchase is made, the plaintiff’s § 1981 claims are 
extinguished.  Though these courts could view post-purchase discrimination as a 
privilege, benefit, term, or condition actionable under the amended statute, they have 
declined to do so.  Alternatively, these courts could follow Justice Brennan’s suggestion 
in his Patterson dissent, and consider post-purchase discrimination evidence that the 
initial contract was made unequally.105  However, most courts have taken neither path, 
ending their analyses with the fact of the complete purchase and denying the statute’s 
protections to this category of post-purchase claims.   
The exclusion of post-purchase discrimination from the coverage of § 1981, and 
courts’ distinguishing such cases from actionable privileges, benefits, terms, and 
conditions cases, is perhaps most clear in Ackaa v. Tommy Hilfiger.106  The Ackaa
plaintiffs argued that their post-purchase harassment by a retail store violated their rights 
under subsection (b) of the statute:  
Plaintiffs contend that they were denied the right to enjoy all the terms, 
benefits and privileges of an implied contract between a retail 
establishment and its customers, i.e., to browse, examine and purchase 
merchandise without harassment, to leave the store without being 
subjected to accusations of theft, and to reenter the store at will for 
additional shopping, return or exchange of merchandise.107
The court characterized the plaintiffs’ argument as asserting a “presumed right to be free 
of race discrimination while accepting a store's invitation to shop.”108  Because the 
plaintiffs had completed their transactions in the store that day, in the court’s eyes, the 
only right that remained for them to assert was a “future and potential, rather than 
105 Id. at 207-08.
106
 No. 96-8262, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3570 (E.D. Pa. March 24, 1998).
107 Id. at *14.
108 Id. 
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present, opportunit[y] to engage in contractual relations with the defendant.”109  As in the 
browser and potential customer cases, a right to a future contract is no right at all under § 
1981, and post-purchase discrimination is therefore outside the purview of the statute.   
The First and Eighth Circuits have faced post-purchase discrimination claims 
similar to Ackaa and come to similar conclusions.  In Garrett, an African American 
customer successfully purchased an item, left the store, and was then pursued to his home 
by police officers who questioned him about shoplifting.110  The First Circuit rejected the 
plaintiff’s § 1981 claim, reasoning that “by the time he returned home, his contract with 
Radio Shack had been fully performed, and he was not deprived of the benefit of the 
bargain by subsequent events.”111  In Youngblood v. Hy-Vee Food Stores, Inc.,112 a 
customer was detained after he purchased a canister of beef jerky in which he had 
allegedly stuffed extra jerky from another container.  Though recognizing only “scant 
precedent” on the issue of post-purchase § 1981 claims, the Eighth Circuit held that 
“once the purchase is completed, no contractual relationship remains.”113  Therefore, 
109 Id. at *17.  Other post-purchase cases contain similar statements.  See, e.g., Garrett,
295 F.3d at 102 (“[A] complaint must allege the actual loss of a contract interest, not 
simply the theoretical loss of a possible future opportunity to modify a contract.”); Office 
Max, 89 F.3d at 414 (“A claim for interference with the right to make and enforce a 
contract must allege the actual loss of a contract interest, not merely the possible loss of 
future contract opportunities.”); Holmes v. Dillard’s Dept. Stores, No. 99-3444, 2000 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17263 (D. La. Nov. 17, 2000) (“There is no generalized right under 
section 1981 to have access to opportunities to make prospective contracts.”).  
110 Garrett, 295 F.3d at 96.
111 Id. at 102-03.
112 266 F.3d 851 (8th Cir. 2001).
113 Id. at 854.
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“once Youngblood paid the cashier and received the beef jerky from the cashier, neither 
party owed the other any duty under the retail-sale contract.”114
Several district courts have decided post-purchase § 1981 cases in the same way, 
viewing the retail contract as a contractual moment and refusing to extend § 1981’s 
protections to discriminatory acts by retailers after that moment.  In Flowers v. TJX
Cos.,115 African American plaintiffs who were escorted from a store by police after 
purchasing could not maintain a § 1981 action because “plaintiffs completed their retail 
transactions at T.J. Maxx despite the alleged discrimination of defendants.”  In Lewis v. 
J.C. Penney Company, Inc.,116 after making her purchases, an African American shopper 
was followed to her car, accused of shoplifting, and searched more rigorously than her 
white friend.  The court dismissed her § 1981 claim on the ground that “Lewis had done 
her shopping and was leaving the store; no contractual relationship remained.”117  In 
Hickerson v. Macy’s Department Store at Esplanade Mall,118 security guards detained the 
African American plaintiff in the parking lot and accused him of stealing a pair jeans he 
had exchanged at the store.  In granting the store’s motion to dismiss, the court held that 
“Had Hickerson been prevented from making a particular purchase, or from returning the 
114 Id.; see also Chu v. Gordmans, Inc., No. 01-182, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26623 (D. 
Neb. Apr. 12, 2002) (granting summary judgment to the defendant retail store; stating, 
“Like Youngblood, Hyun Chu was allowed to shop and pay for her selections without 
interference. Palmer stopped, questioned, and inspected her merchandise only after she 
had completed her shopping.”); Thomas v. Trotter, No. 04-0672, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
292 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 6, 2006) (finding no § 1981 violation in post-purchase 
discrimination); Rogers v. Elliott, 135 F. Supp. 2d 1312, 1314-15 (N.D. Ga. 2001)
(same).
115
 No. 91-CV-1339, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10453, at *20 (N.D.N.Y. July 15, 1994).
116
 948 F. Supp. 367 (D. Del. 1996).
117 Id. at 372.
118
 No. 98-3170, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3244 (E.D. La. March 16, 1999).
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pants he had previously bought, he might have a section 1981 claim.  Because he had 
already returned the pants, however, his section 1981 claim fails.”119
Finally, one court has actually cited Patterson, despite its explicit overruling by 
the 1991 Civil Rights Act’s amendments to § 1981.  In Thomas v. National Amusements, 
Inc.,120 the District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan relied on Patterson for the 
proposition that “conduct that occurs after the formation of a contract and which does not 
interfere with the right to enforce established contractual obligations” is not actionable 
under § 1981.  The court then dismissed the African American plaintiffs’ claim that they, 
but not white patrons, were required to exchange the incorrect movie tickets they had 
purchased for correct ones.121
The lone exception to the general rule requiring dismissal of post-purchase 
discrimination § 1981 cases is Leach v. Heyman.122  The Leach court accepted as a 
violation of § 1981 an African American plaintiff’s claim of post-purchase discrimination 
in the form of a racial epithet during a disagreement between the plaintiff and a store 
clerk.  Rejecting the defendant’s argument that § 1981’s protection is limited to 
“circumstances involving a complete refusal to serve members of a protected group,” the 
court stated that “racial animus can offend a customer equally whether he gets no service 
at all or is served in a manner that marks him with the badge of slavery that the Civil 
Rights Acts were enacted to remove.”123  The court reasoned further:
I am persuaded that a jury could find that [the clerk’s] conduct throughout 
the course of her dealing with plaintiff was indicative of racial animus, 
119 Id. at *6-*7.
120
 No. 98-71215, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5188 (E.D. MI Feb. 24, 1999).
121 Id. at *8.
122 233 F. Supp. 2d 906 (N.D. Ohio 2002).
123 Id. at 909.
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even though that motivation may have overtly manifested itself only when 
[she] came after plaintiff as he was leaving the store. Though she only 
called plaintiff a name that any African-American would find deeply 
offensive after he had completed his purchases and was about to exit, that 
she did so at all is clear and direct proof of bias. It also indicates that the 
“service” she provided was less than that which she might have provided, 
had plaintiff been Caucasian.124
By recognizing a post-purchase § 1981 violation, the Leach court, like the Allen and 
Williams courts above, seemed to view cases in the post-purchase category as close to 
those in the category of actionable privileges, benefits, terms, and conditions.  The court 
also began to move away from the vision of retail contracts as existing only at a single 
moment, and the related interpretation of § 1981 as providing protection only at that 
moment.  By considering the entire “course of [the] dealing”125 between the customer and 
the store clerk, the court rejected the more typical, narrow, view of retail contracts and § 
1981.
Thus, courts since 1991 have interpreted § 1981 narrowly in two 
ways.  Some courts have limited the statute’s coverage to only the “make and enforce” 
clause, seeming to ignore subsection (b)’s requirement of equality in a contract’s 
privileges, benefits, terms, and conditions.  Other courts have included the privileges, 
benefits, terms, and conditions clause in their analyses, but have accepted very few acts 
of discrimination by retailers as actionable.  The privileges, benefits, terms, and 
conditions that these courts have recognized are all tightly tethered to the contractual 
moment, the point of purchase.  This twice-narrowed application of § 1981, in turn, has 
excluded three categories of cases from the statute’s coverage: those involving browsers 
124 Id. at 911.
125 Id.
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and potential customers, those involving pre-purchase discrimination, and those 
involving discrimination after a customer’s purchase.  The next Part attempts to explain 
why judges might narrow § 1981, thereby leaving so many cases of clear discrimination 
outside the statute’s coverage.
Part V:  Explanation of Courts’ § 1981 Jurisprudence
Judges who interpret §1981 narrowly justify their decisions with a similar refrain: 
they fear that the amended statute, if unchecked, will be converted from a limited, 
contracts-based statute into a generalized anti-discrimination law. 126  This worry about an
unchecked § 1981 seems driven by two underlying concerns.  First, beneath courts’ 
restricted readings of the statute lies a distinction between social and civil rights, the idea 
that, though commercial transactions might appropriately be regulated by the state, 
private social interactions may not.  If courts were to read § 1981 broadly, they would 
insert state control into private social behavior properly left unregulated.  Courts 
therefore define a retail contract as beginning and ending at one discrete point in time and 
tie § 1981’s coverage to that single, identifiable contractual moment.  In this way, they 
limit the statute’s reach into what they might define as the “private,” “social” pre-
purchase, post-purchase, and browsing behavior of customers and retailers.  
This reluctance to expand § 1981 into the realm of private behavior was evident in 
Patterson itself, in which the Court supported its denial of the plaintiff’s claim by 
126
 It is also possible that the anti-plaintiff weight of judges’ opinions is explained by the 
political affiliation of the Presidents who appointed them.  However, an examination of 
the cases cited in Parts III and IV reveals no significant link between the party affiliation 
of judges’ appointing Presidents and the outcome of § 1981 retail store cases.  Of the 
judges who decided against plaintiffs, fifty percent were appointed by Democrats.  Of the 
judges who decided for plaintiffs, fifty-eight percent were Democrat appointees.
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pointing to the statute’s limited scope when applied to acts of discrimination by private 
citizens:
The law now reflects society's consensus that discrimination based on the 
color of one's skin is a profound wrong of tragic dimension.  Neither our 
words nor our decisions should be interpreted as signaling one inch of 
retreat from Congress' policy to forbid discrimination in the private, as 
well as the public, sphere.  Nevertheless, in the area of private 
discrimination, to which the ordinance of the Constitution does not 
directly extend, our role is limited to interpreting what Congress may do 
and has done.127
By reading the statute as unable to reach harassment that took place on the job, in the 
course of daily interaction among employees, the court signaled its unwillingness to 
interpret § 1981 as a general prohibition against private acts of race discrimination not 
tethered to a particular contractual moment.
Post-Patterson, post-1991 courts have echoed these sentiments.  In Lewis v. J.C. 
Penney Company, Inc.,128 the court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the contract 
between customer and retailer began with the customer’s entry into the store.  The court 
reasoned that “Allowing plaintiff to proceed under such a theory would come close to 
nullifying the contract requirement of section 1981 altogether, thereby transforming the
statute into a general cause of action for race discrimination in all contexts.”129  Similarly, 
127 Patterson, 491 U.S. at 188.
128 Lewis, 948 F. Supp. at 371.
129 Id. at 371-72 (emphasis added).  It is important to note that even the broader 
interpretations of § 1981 advanced by this paper would not convert the statute into a ban 
on race discrimination “in all contexts.”  It would be impossible to argue, for example, 
that § 1981 prohibits a person on the street from addressing another passer-by with a 
racial epithet.  The statute’s coverage, even if interpreted to apply to pre-purchase, post-
purchase, browser, and potential customer discrimination, would still hinge on the 
existence of some contractual relationship.  
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in Arguello v. Conoco,130 the Fifth Circuit explained its narrow application of § 1981: “42 
U.S.C.S. § 1981 does not provide a general cause of action for race discrimination.  
Rather, it prohibits intentional race discrimination with respect to certain enumerated 
activities.”  In Youngblood v. Hy-Vee Food Stores, Inc.,131 the Eight Circuit came to the 
same conclusion, holding that “Section 1981 does not provide a general cause of action 
for race discrimination if in fact it occurred.  The requirement remains that a plaintiff 
must point to some contractual relationship in order to bring a claim under Section 1981.” 
As in Patterson, these courts’ refusal to interpret § 1981 as a bar against 
discrimination “in all contexts” echoes the sharp distinctions drawn by early courts 
between permissible regulation of civil and political rights and impermissible regulation 
of the social sphere.  Today’s courts seem comfortable with prohibiting race and national 
origin discrimination at the moment of contract, but shy away from banning 
discrimination in other phases of the relationship between customer and store.  This line-
drawing between the commercial and the social, and concomitant refusal to regulate the 
“social,” can be seen as today’s incarnation of early public accommodations cases like 
Plessy v. Ferguson.132  The Plessy court made just such a distinction, explaining: 
The object of the [Fourteenth Amendment] was undoubtedly to enforce 
the absolute equality of the two races before the law, but in the nature of 
things it could not have been intended to abolish distinctions based upon 
color, or to enforce social, as distinguished from political equality, or a 
commingling of the two races upon terms unsatisfactory to either.133
130 Arguello, 330 F.3d at 358.
131 Youngblood, 266 F.3d at 855; see also Garrett, 295 F.3d at 100 (“ The legislative 
history of the 1991 amendment makes it crystal clear that Congress did not intend to 
convert section 1981 into a general prohibition against race discrimination.”); Baltimore-
Clark, 270 F. Supp. 2d at 700 (noting that, by expanding § 1981’s coverage, “Congress 
did not intend to convert § 1981 into a general prohibition against race discrimination”).  
132
 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
133 Id. at 544 (emphasis added).
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While such line-drawing between civil and social rights is certainly acceptable in some 
contexts—a parent’s choice of a babysitter is not and should not be regulated by civil 
rights laws, for example—courts deciding § 1981 retail store cases have consistently 
drawn that line in the wrong place.  A store is no more private than the railroad car in 
Plessy; courts’ concerns about regulating private or social affairs is therefore misplaced 
in the context of race and national origin discrimination in retail stores.  
A second possible explanation for courts’ narrow interpretations of § 1981— and 
the “contractual moment” vision of a retail contract that lies beneath those 
interpretations— might be a concern about transforming § 1981 into a full-blown public 
accommodations law for retail stores.134  In refusing to apply § 1981 broadly, judges have 
preserved the political balance struck with the passage of Title II of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, a compromise that resulted in the specific exclusion of retail stores from the 
Act’s prohibition of discrimination in places of public accommodation.  In an early 
version of what eventually became the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title II covered “every 
form of business” and excluded only “rooming houses with five units or less.”135
However, in response to concerns that such a broad public accommodations provision 
would spark resistance by Southern Congressmen136 and doom the bill, the Title II 
134
 Note that even “full-blown” public accommodations statutes are limited in their reach, 
and exempt private and religious establishments and organizations.  See Title II, 42 
U.S.C. § 2000a (2005) (exempting private establishments); Americans with Disabilities 
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12187 (2005) (exempting private clubs and religious organizations). 
135 CHARLES & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF 
THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 35 (Seven Locks Press 1985).
136
 See in particular statements by Judge Smith of Virginia: “Referring to the fact that a 
chiropodist whose office was in a hotel would be covered by Title II, he made a shrill 
outburst.  ‘If I were cutting corns,’ he cried, ‘I would want to know whose feet I would 
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proposal was amended to exclude retail stores and personal service firms, such as 
barbershops.137  Today’s judges, by limiting the reach of § 1981 in retail stores, have kept 
the statute from being transformed into a federal public accommodations act that would 
fill the gap left by Congress’ compromise in 1964.138
Like courts’ concern with maintaining the civil-social distinction, this fear of 
converting § 1981 into a general anti-discrimination law is reasonable.  However, courts 
have responded to a reasonable fear in an unreasonable way.  In effect, courts interpreting 
§ 1981 in retail store contexts have given shopkeepers an affirmative right to 
discriminate, a right that no one argues is conferred by retail stores’ exclusion from Title 
II.139
have to be monkeying around with.  I would want to know whether they smelled good or 
bad.’”  Id. at 110.    
137 Id. at 47, 58.
138
 Some, such as Professor William Eskridge, argue that reading a later statute back onto 
an earlier statue to fill the gaps in the earlier statute is in fact an appropriate method of 
statutory interpretation.  William N. Eskridge Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 
U. PA. L. REV. 1479, 1479, 1504 (1987).  (“Federal judges interpreting the Constitution 
typically consider not only the constitutional text and its historical background, but also 
its subsequent interpretational history, related constitutional developments, and current 
societal facts . . .  [In other countries,] [t]he civil law codes typically instruct judges to 
interpret unclear statutes and fill in statutory lacunae by looking to analogous statutory 
rules, general principles of the state's legal order, and the justice or equity of the case.”).  
In addition, as a general matter, the chance that § 1981 might be interpreted to fill a gap 
in Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 does not doom that interpretation of § 1981.  
“The legislature also clarified its intent with regard to statutory interpretation.  Congress 
instructed that as a general rule of construction, one federal civil rights law should not be 
interpreted to narrow the scope of protection of another; thus, section 1981’s remedies are 
independent of other laws.”  Evan William Glover, Legitimacy of Independent 
Contractor Suits for Hostile Work Environment Under Section 1981, 52 ALA. L. REV.
1301, 1304 n.27 (2001). 
139 In fact, Title II explicitly allows enforcement of any other state or federal law not 
inconsistent with Title II, “including any statute or ordinance requiring nondiscrimination 
in public establishments or accommodations. . . .”  42 U.S.C. § 2000a-6(b).
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Part VI:  Critique of Courts’ § 1981 Jurisprudence
Whether motivated by a fear of improperly expanding the statute into the realm of 
the private and the social or by a desire to preserve Congress’ political compromise
struck in 1964, the courts that have twice-narrowed § 1981 in retail store cases have been 
wrong as a matter of statutory interpretation and contract law.  They have also been 
wrong as a matter of history, making decisions that are at odds with the development of 
property and contract law over time.    
A. Statutory Interpretation
First, as a matter of statutory interpretation, courts’ narrow applications of § 1981 
have ignored the amendments that broadened the statute’s coverage.  On the text alone, 
judges’ narrow § 1981 decisions are misguided, disregarding an entire clause, subsection 
(b), added by Congress in 1991.  Judges’ limited readings of the statute have also 
departed from the goals of the Congress that passed the 1991 Civil Rights Act, as evident 
in the Act’s legislative history.  Finally, the narrow view of § 1981 is contrary to the 
maxim of statutory interpretation that remedial statutes are to be read broadly.  
Prior to 1991, § 1981 guaranteed to all persons the same right as white citizens “to 
make and enforce contracts.”  In 1991, Congress added subsection (b) entitled “‘make 
and enforce contracts’ defined,” which states, “For purposes of this section, the term 
‘make and enforce contracts’ includes the making, performance, modification, and 
termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and 
conditions of the contractual relationship.”  Though phrased merely as a definition of 
“make and enforce contracts,” subsection (b) could in fact be read in multiple ways.  The 
use of the word “includes” could indicate that the list of contractual activities enumerated 
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in the clause is non-exhaustive.  Alternatively, the fact that the 1991 amendments were a 
reaction to the Supreme Court’s Patterson decision could signal that subsection (b) was 
meant primarily to reach discrimination after contract formation, the focal point of the 
narrow Patterson decision.  Finally, subsection (b)’s reference to a “contractual 
relationship” rather than just a “contract” could shift the statute’s coverage to the entire 
interaction between contracting parties, rather than just the contents of the final bargain.  
In Garrett, Judge Selya chose to read subsection (b) in this way, extending the statute’s 
protection beyond the contours of a specific contract:
The 1991 expansion of the definition of ‘make and enforce contracts’ in 
section 1981, then, extends the reach of the statute to situations beyond the 
four corners of a particular contract; the extension applies to those 
situations in which a merchant, acting out of racial animus, impedes a 
customer’s ability to enter into, or enjoy the benefits of, a contractual 
relationship.140
Yet even if a court does not accept any of these particular readings of 
subsection (b), the clause must have some function within the statute.  At 
minimum, it should act as a signal to courts that the statute’s coverage may not be 
read to end with the “make and enforce” clause of subsection (a).  Given the 
presence of subsection (b), some courts’ complete disregard for the fact that the 
statute was amended in 1991, even to the point of citing Patterson, appears quite 
strange.141  In some sense, these judges’ ignoring of subsection (b) should not be 
categorized under “statutory interpretation” at all.  Arguably, this is a question 
simply of reading, rather than interpreting.
140 Garrett, 295 F.3d at 100.  Despite this good reasoning, the First Circuit upheld the 
district court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s claim, concluding that he had not shown 
discriminatory interference with any phase of his contractual relationship with the store.
141
 See Part III, supra; Thomas, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5188, at *8.
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However, even the courts that have adopted a slightly broader view of the statute 
have appeared to ignore the expanded version of the text, or at least shy away from full 
engagement with subsection (b).  Very few courts have recognized the potential difficulty 
in determining what does and does not fall within the contractual activities enumerated 
by the statute.  Again, as Judge Selya observed in Garrett, “The harder cases occupy the 
middle ground: cases in which a contract was made and the alleged discrimination bears 
some relation to it … Particularly after the passage of the 1991 amendment, such 
situations call for careful line-drawing, case by case.”142  As illustrated by the pre- and 
post-purchase discrimination cases in Part IV, few, if any, judges tackle the hard, case by 
case analysis necessary to determine whether a retailer’s discrimination represents 
interference with a retail contract’s “making,” “performance,” “modification,” 
“termination,” “benefits,” “privileges,” “terms,” or “conditions.”  Instead, these courts 
have generally dismissed plaintiffs’ claims, drawing the boundaries of the statute’s 
protections very narrowly, and tying its coverage to one, fleeting contractual moment.  
In addition to ignoring the full text of the statute, the narrow decisions by these 
courts also contradict the goals of Congress in amending § 1981.  An examination of the 
legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 shows that Congress was motivated by 
dissatisfaction with the Supreme Court’s restricted Patterson decision and a desire to 
expand the reach of the statute beyond the moment of contract formation.  In his 
discussion of the amended statute, Representative Henry Hyde of Illinois described the 
new § 1981’s expanded scope.  His reference to an African American child’s admittance 
to a private school could just as easily apply to retail stores:    
142 Garrett, 295 F.3d at 101.
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As written, therefore, section 1981 provides insufficient protection against 
racial discrimination in the context of contracts. In particular, it provides 
no relief for discrimination in the performance of contracts (as contrasted 
with the making and enforcement of contracts). Section 1981, as amended 
by this Act, will provide a remedy for individuals who are subjected to 
discriminatory performance of their employment contracts (through racial 
harassment, for example) or are dismissed or denied promotions because 
of race. In addition, the discriminatory infringement of contractual rights 
that do not involve employment will be made actionable under section 
1981. This will, for example, create a remedy for a black child who is 
admitted to a private school as required pursuant to section 1981, but it 
then subjected to discriminatory treatment in the performance of the 
contract once he or she is attending the school.143
Senator Orrin Hatch of Utah made similar observations about the newly broadened § 
1981, noting:
[W]e have overturned the Patterson versus McLean case, to cover racial 
discrimination in terms and conditions of contracts under section 1981.  
All postcontract matters will now be covered by the racial provisions of 
section 1981, and that is a good step.  President Bush has been willing to 
overturn Patterson versus McLean from the beginning, and so have all of 
us.144
Section 1981 in the form described by Representative Hyde and Senator Hatch is 
therefore quite broad, and would seem to provide significant protection beyond the 
contractual moment.
In addition to Representative Hyde’s and Senator Hatch’s comments regarding the 
new statute’s scope, other Senators and Representatives commented on its proper method
of interpretation.  An interpretive memorandum by the sponsors of the Senate bill, which 
also represented “the views of the [George H.W. Bush] administration,” explained that 
the statute’s new second clause expanding the definition of “make and enforce contracts,” 
143
 137 CONG. REC. H9505, H9543 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1991) (statement of Rep. Hyde) 
(emphasis added).
144
 137 CONG. REC. S15472, S15498 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
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was “illustrative only, and should be given broad construction to allow a remedy for any 
act of intentional discrimination committed in the making or the performance of a 
contract.”145  According to the sponsors, the amended statute’s enumeration of “making,” 
“performance,” “modification,” “termination,” “benefits,” “privileges,” “terms,” and 
“conditions” should only be a starting point, a floor, rather than a ceiling.  Given this 
legislative history, courts’ narrow § 1981 decisions have strayed not only from the text of 
the amended statute, but also from the goals of the 1991 amendments.
Finally, judges’ restricted applications of § 1981 fly in the face of the basic canon 
of statutory interpretation that remedial legislation is to be read broadly, to favor the 
legislation’s beneficiaries.  Though canons of statutory interpretation can certainly be 
challenged, those challenges do not justify courts’ narrow interpretations of § 1981 in 
retail store cases.146  Judge Posner has outlined a major critique of the “broad 
interpretation” canon, arguing:
The idea behind this canon is that if the legislature is trying to remedy 
some ill, it would want the courts to construe the legislation to make it a 
more rather than a less effective remedy for that ill.  This would be a 
sound working rule if every statute -- at least every statute that could fairly 
be characterized as “remedial” (which I suppose is every regulatory statute 
that does not prescribe penal sanctions and so comes under another canon, 
which I discuss later) -- were passed because a majority of the legislators 
wanted to stamp out some practice they considered to be an evil; 
presumably they would want the courts to construe the statute to advance 
that objective.  But if, as is often true, the statute is a compromise between 
one group of legislators that holds a simple remedial objective but lacks a 
majority and another group that has reservations about the objective, a 
145 Id. at S15483 (statement of Sen. Danforth).
146 See, e.g., Karl Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules 
or Canons about How Statutes are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395 (1950) 
(identifying conflicts among canons of statutory interpretation).  
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court that construed the statute broadly would upset the compromise that 
the statute was intended to embody. 147
Judge Posner’s critique rests on two contingencies: that the statute not be truly remedial, 
and that the statute not be passed by a convincing majority of the legislators.  As an initial 
matter, civil rights statutes, particularly those passed during Reconstruction, are
quintessentially remedial.  The Supreme Court has held with regard to the Equal 
Protection Clause, the authority under which § 1981 was reenacted in 1870, that “broad 
interpretation [is] particularly important with regard to racial discrimination, since that 
was the principal evil against which the Equal Protection Clause was directed, and the 
principal constitutional prohibition that some of the States stubbornly ignored.”148
Adding another remedial layer, Congress then amended § 1981 specifically to remedy the 
harm done by the Supreme Court’s narrow Patterson decision.  Congress also gave 
unmistakable support to the 1991 amendments: the Senate passed the Act with a vote of 
ninety-three to five, with two not voting, and the House passed it by a margin of 381 to 
thirty-eight votes, with thirteen not voting.149  Critiques such as Posner’s, though perhaps 
applicable to other categories of statute, fall short when applied to § 1981.  Though 
judges could comfortably employ this maxim of statutory interpretation in § 1981 retail 
store cases and extend the statute’s coverage to many claims they now dismiss, many 
steadfastly refuse to do so.
147
 Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation— in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 
50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 808-809 (1983). 
148
 Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004).  
149 U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes 102nd Congress, 1st Session, available at 
http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=1
02&session=1&vote=00238 and http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/bdquery/z?d102:SN01745:@@@R.  Notably, the House bill had 175 co-sponsors.  
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B. Contract Law
These narrow analyses are also wrong as a matter of contract law.  As outlined in 
Part III, courts have interpreted both the duration and the content of retail contracts quite 
narrowly.  For the most part, they have viewed the contract as beginning and ending with 
the moment of exchange of money for goods.  They have also seen retail contracts as 
bargains solely for the goods purchased.  Though courts’ § 1981 decisions seem 
motivated by this narrow view of contract, it is in fact extremely rare to find a § 1981 
retail decision in which a judge has actually analyzed the contract at hand, with reference 
to principles of contract law.  Garrett v. Tandy Corp. is the one exception, with Judge 
Selya acknowledging the need to turn to state contract law.150  For the most part, though, 
judges have proceeded almost blindly through § 1981 analyses, making conclusory and 
unsupported decisions about a retail contract’s duration and content.    
In neglecting to analyze the contracts that lie under a § 1981 claim, courts since 
1991 have followed, improperly, in the Supreme Court’s footsteps.  Professor Steven J. 
Burton criticizes Patterson on this ground, noting, “None of the nine Supreme Court 
justices … consulted contract law to interpret that statute, and counsel for neither of the 
parties used it in their advocacy.”151  According to Burton, because “section 1981 does 
not establish an independent statutory right to make and enforce contracts,” courts have 
no choice but to turn to “a right that exists elsewhere in the law—in particular, in the law 
150 Garrett, 295 F.3d at 100 (“Section 1981, insofar as it is pertinent here, pivots on 
contractual relationships, and the contours of what constitutes a ‘contract’ (or a 
‘contractual relationship,’ for that matter) are properly found in state law.”)  One other    
§ 1981 case has drawn on state contract law, but is inapposite here, as it involves state 
laws concerning the redemption of coupons.  Hampton v. Dillard Dept. Stores, 247 F.3d 
1091 (10th Cir. 2001). 
151
 Steven J. Burton, Racial Discrimination in Contract Performance: Patterson and a 
State Law Alternative, 25 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 431, 446 (1990).
58
of contracts.”152  By failing to draw upon the body of contract law, both the Patterson
Court and post-1991 courts have issued decisions in § 1981 retail store cases that are 
flawed, particularly in their treatment of a retail contract’s duration and content.  
1. Duration
Courts could define a retail contract’s duration in several ways.  First, a contract 
might be viewed not as a moment, but rather as a continuing interaction between the 
contracting parties.  “Contract” becomes a verb, rather than a noun.153 In this view, 
§ 1981 does not protect the contents of a particular agreement frozen in time, but instead 
a customer’s ability to exercise his or her right to contract over the course of his or her 
interaction with a retailer.  The customer’s movement through the store, evaluation of the 
merchandise, and consideration of the store’s various guarantees and representations 
would all be components of the retail contract.  The contract is formed gradually, as a 
product of the customer’s exercise of his or her right to contract over time.  Any 
interference with that right, whether before, during, or after a purchase is made, is then 
prohibited by § 1981.      
In critiquing Patterson, Professor George H. Taylor argues that this view of a 
right to contract, exercised over the course of a relationship, is in fact mandated by the 
law of contracts:
If the Court had been more attentive to the insights of contract law, it 
would have realized that contract law denies that the moment of contract 
formation is decisive. The Uniform Commercial Code, for example, 
acknowledges the potential need to define contract formation where “the 
moment of its making is undetermined.”  As the secondary commentaries 
have suggested, the Code recognizes the possibility of circumstances 
152 Id.
153
 Professor Joseph William Singer suggested this idea.
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contrary to the orthodox catechism that there is a definite moment in time 
when a party becomes contractually bound on a promise.154
Burton makes a similar point, describing the contract right as “a single integrated legal 
power” and noting that, “[f]ar from isolating formation, performance, and enforcement 
from each other, the modern law of contracts treats the stages of contract as 
interdependent and mutually supporting parts of a coherent social practice.”155  Here, 
Burton’s argument echoes the characterization of contract as “evidence of a vital, 
ongoing relationship between human beings” from Justice Stevens’ Patterson dissent.156
Though Burton was writing in 1990, when § 1981 covered only contracts’ making 
and enforcement, his insights hold true today when applied to the broadened statute.  If 
all customers possess an integrated, continuing right to contract, and the “moment of 
contract formation” is indeterminate, courts can then view the interaction between a 
retailer and those who enter his or her store as occurring on a continuum.  Browsers could 
not be excluded from § 1981’s protections, as a browser’s movement through the store 
and contemplation of the store’s goods and prices would represent an exercise of his or 
her right to contract.  In addition, customers who have already made purchases become 
browsers or potential customers once again, or are parties to a continuing contractual 
relationship with a retailer, able to “enforce” or “perform” their contract with regard to 
the goods purchased.  Contracts in retail stores loop back on themselves, and those who 
enter are at every point exercising in some manner an integrated “right to contract.”  
154
 George H. Taylor, Textualism at Work, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 259, 275 (1995).  See also
U.C.C. § 2-204(2) (“An agreement sufficient to constitute a contract for sale may be 
found even though the moment of its making is undetermined.”).  
155
 Burton, supra note 152, at 458.
156 Patterson, 491 U.S. at 221.
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A scenario suggested by Professor Elizabeth Warrren157 illustrates this view of a 
retail contract’s duration. From the time a potential customer enters a retail store, he or 
she begins to exercise the right to contract, and the terms of the contract between the 
customer and retailer form over time.  If browsers and potential customers are not 
allowed to walk freely through a store, ask questions, examine the goods available, 
compare prices, and consider stores’ representations of the quality of the goods, they miss 
critical steps in the contracting process. For example, a banner hanging in a store 
advertising a money-back guarantee or a sign describing the goods sold as “100 % 
cotton” would become part of the contract between store and customer.  If a customer is 
discriminatorily pulled into a back room on suspicion of shoplifting or ejected from a 
store prior to making a purchase, he or she is not allowed to read the banner or consider 
the sign, and has not been able to exercise equally his or her right to contract. This view 
of “contract” as a verb rather than a noun, as a process rather than a moment, stays true to 
the contract law underpinnings of § 1981 and gives full force to Congress’ broadening of 
the statute in 1991.  However, courts have not adopted this view, and instead issue 
opinions that rely on the misguided idea that a retail contract begins and ends at a single 
moment.
A second possible view of a retail contract’s duration draws more explicitly on 
present-day state contract law, and contemplates a series of contracts’ being made and re-
made throughout a customer’s time in a store.  In Garrett v. Tandy Corp., the First Circuit 
stated that, “[S]hopping in a retail store may involve multiple contracts.  Each time a 
customer takes an item off the shelf, a new contract looms, and each time the item is 
157 Professor Elizabeth Warren (personal communication June 5, 2005).  
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returned, the potential contract is extinguished.”158  Though in the end the Garrett court 
upheld the lower court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s claim, its decision is notable in its 
engagement with the law of contracts.
Because no state law definition of a retail contract existed in Maine, where 
Garrett arose, the court drew on state contract cases from Maryland, Georgia, and 
Oklahoma to develop this vision of rolling and continuous retail contracts.  These three 
cases concerned a retailer’s responsibility for pre-purchase injuries suffered by customers 
from exploding soda bottles.  In order to determine the retailers’ liability, the courts had 
to determine first whether the customer had entered into a contract with the store at the 
time of the explosion.  Unlike the courts deciding § 1981 retail store cases, the Maryland, 
Georgia, and Oklahoma Supreme Courts uniformly distinguished between a retail 
contract and a retail sale.  In these courts’ analyses, 
[T]he retailer's act of placing the bottles upon the shelf with the price 
stamped upon the six-pack in which they were contained manifested an 
intent to offer them for sale, the terms of the offer being that it would pass 
title to the goods when [the customer] presented them at the check-out 
counter and paid the stated price in cash.  We also think that the evidence 
is sufficient to show that [the customer’s] act of taking physical possession 
of the goods with the intent to purchase them manifested an intent to 
accept the offer and a promise to take them to the check-out counter and 
pay for them there.159
The Georgia Supreme Court explained further that a customer could manifest his or her 
“acceptance” in one of three ways: 
(1) by delivering the goods to the check-out counter and paying for them; 
(2) by the promise to pay for the goods as evidenced by their physical 
delivery to the check-out counter; and (3) by the promise to deliver the 
158 Garrett, 295 F.3d at 100. 
159 Giant Food, Inc. v. Wash. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 273 Md. 592, 605 (1975). 
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goods to the check-out counter and to pay for them there as evidenced by 
taking physical possession of the goods by their removal from the shelf. 160
By stocking the shelves, a store makes an offer, or a promise, to sell.  By picking up the 
item, the customer accepts, and makes a return promise to pay.  The contract is made at 
that point, and the sale, a separate transaction, is completed at the checkout counter.
Only one § 1981 retail store court has come close to viewing the interaction 
between a customer and a retail store in this manner.  In Ackerman v. Food-4-Less, the 
court stated:
The purpose of going to a grocery store is to buy groceries.  The purpose 
of picking an item off the shelf at a grocery store is so one may buy it.  We 
feel that it is a very reasonable inference that Plaintiff picked up the 
Spanish spice powder so that she could purchase the seasoning.161
The court therefore seemed to view the plaintiff’s “taking physical possession of the 
goods by their removal from the shelf”162 as an acceptance of the store’s offer.  
Nevertheless, later in the decision, the Ackerman court reverted to an idea of the contract 
and the sale as being identical and existing only at the moment of purchase, stating that if 
the plaintiff had been able to purchase groceries, a contract would have been made.163
This collapsing of contract and sale into a single contractual moment is the typical 
approach by courts in § 1981 retail store cases, despite state contract law to the contrary.
160
 Fender v. Colonial Stores, Inc., 138 Ga. App. 31, 33-34 (1976); see also Barker v. 
Allied Supermarket, 596 P.2d 870, 871 (1979) (“The issue here is whether a buyer of 
goods who is invited by a merchant to take possession thereof from a self-service display 
and to defer payment to sometime subsequent to the taking of possession, has the 
protection of an implied warranty of merchantability.  We hold he does.”).    
161 Ackerman, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8813, at *8-*9.
162 Fender, 138 Ga. App. at 33-34.
163 Ackerman, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8813, at *9. 
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This state-law based interpretation would save the claims of shoppers who 
experience pre-purchase discrimination.  Because the contract is made when a customer 
chooses an item from a shelf, this view of contract formation would also preserve the 
claims of potential customers who consider purchasing but do not complete a sale.  
However, as in Garrett itself, claims of post-purchase discrimination would still remain 
outside the coverage of § 1981.  Taylor notes this problem:    
In the example favored by treatise writers, where a customer is injured by 
a bottle that explodes after the customer has taken it off the grocery store 
shelf, a contract between store and customer had already been formed at 
the time of injury -- the merchant had made an offer through the stocking 
of the goods, and the customer had accepted the offer through the 
performance of taking the item from the shelf.  Under this logic, where a 
cashier [engages in discrimination after the purchase], this occurs 
subsequent to the formation of a contract and so does not present a viable 
section 1981 claim.164
Claims of browsers, who possess no intent to purchase and therefore might not pick up 
items from shelves, are left out of this formulation of retail contract as well.  This view of 
contract therefore falls short.  In order to bring such claims within the ambit of § 1981, 
courts would need to shift their focus from the contractual moment to the contractual 
process, and begin reading § 1981 as Justice Stevens did in Patterson, as concerned with 
the ongoing relationship between retailer and customer.  
A final proposal for defining a retail contract’s duration has its roots in 
Blackstone’s writings on the obligations of innkeepers and common carriers to the public.  
In this view, a retail store makes an “offer” of its goods by opening itself to the public.  
The customer then “accepts” by making a purchase.  Professor Joseph William Singer 
relates that, in his 1765 Commentaries on the Laws of England, Sir William Blackstone 
164
 Taylor, supra note 155, at 272.  
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identified as an “offer” an innkeeper’s, common carrier’s, “or other victualler[’s]” 
hanging of a sign advertising his services.165  When a customer “steps inside” and 
“tenders the usual fare,” he or she accepts the offer, and the contract is made.166  Wesley 
Hohfeld agreed with this formulation, noting that the only way an offeror of public 
accommodation could rescind his or her offer would be to go out of business.167  More 
recently, Professor Stephen E. Haydon has proposed that “any business that extends a 
general offer of the sale of goods or services arguably has made an offer to contract, and 
anyone denied the opportunity to contract because of his or her race may invoke section 
1981.”168
In the retail store context, the store’s sign would represent the retailer’s offer, and 
a customer’s payment at the checkout counter would represent “tendering the usual fare.”  
The contract would then be complete.  If post-1991 courts were to adopt this view of a 
retail contract’s duration, many § 1981 retail store claims that courts currently dismiss 
would survive.  Any pre-purchase discrimination by a retailer between the time a 
customer enters a store and arrives at the checkout counter would represent a violation of 
§ 1981, likely a core infringement on the customer’s ability to “make” a contract.  
165
 Singer, supra note 8, at 1309.
166 Id. at 1309-10 (“When the carrier holds itself out as open to serve the public, it 
presents an offer that is accepted the moment a passenger tenders the usual fare, and the 
contract is breached if the carrier refuses to serve the passenger.”).
167
 Wesley N. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial 
Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 52 (1913) (“It would therefore seem that the innkeeper is, to 
some extent, like one who had given an option to every traveling member of the public.  
He differs, as regards net legal effect, only because he can extinguish his present 
liabilities and the correlative powers of the traveling members of the public by going out 
of business.”).  
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 Stephen E. Haydon, A Measure of Our Progress: Testing for Race Discrimination in 
Public Accommodations, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1207, 1222 (1997).
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Discrimination against browsers and potential customers, as well as post-purchase 
discrimination, however, might still stand on shaky ground.    
Yet despite the historical roots of this conception of a retail contract’s duration, it 
is almost certainly wrong.  As Singer notes, it is unlikely that the mere fact that a retail 
store is open for business could constitute a specific offer to an individual shopper.169  In 
addition, the modern § 1981 plaintiffs who have attempted to characterize a retail 
contract’s duration in this way have failed.  In Lewis v. J.C. Penney, the plaintiff 
“claimed the existence of an unstated, unwritten contract between commercial 
establishments and the public, that all who enter premises of the former will be treated 
equally regardless of race.”170  In rejecting what it characterized as a “nebulous contract 
theory,” the court stated that, “Allowing plaintiff to proceed under such a theory would 
come close to nullifying the contract requirement of section 1981 altogether, thereby 
transforming the statute into a general cause of action for race discrimination in all 
contexts.”  Likewise, in Ackaa v. Tommy Hilfiger,171 the court rejected the plaintiff’s 
argument for a “presumed right to be free of race discrimination while accepting a store's 
invitation to shop.”  Building on decisions like Lewis and Ackaa, Professor Deseriee A. 
Kennedy summarizes courts’ approach: “Most courts do not recognize as viable claims of 
black plaintiffs to the same right to shop as whites.  Consumers who allege 
discriminatory treatment in the form of being followed or subjected to heightened 
surveillance, without more, frequently fail to articulate a viable cause of action under 
169
 Singer, supra note 8, at 1346 (“[O]pening up an inn to the public would not be 
considered a promise to serve particular individuals that is sufficiently definite so as to 
constitute a legally-binding obligation.”).   
170 Lewis, 948 F. Supp. at 371.
171 Ackaa, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3570, at *14 (emphasis added).
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Section 1981.”172 Thus, like the rolling contracts in Garrett, the  Blackstonian idea of a 
store’s general offer to the public, accepted by a customer’s tender of money, is also 
inadequate.173  For § 1981 to provide the protection its drafters in 1866 and its revisers in 
1991 intended, courts should revise their vision of a retail contract’s duration, and accept 
the idea of contract as a process, rather than a moment.    
2. Content
In addition to their missteps in defining the duration of a retail contract, courts 
have been wrong in limiting the bargain between a customer and a store to the goods 
purchased.  In his Patterson dissent, Justice Brennan highlighted the absurdity of the 
court’s decision to restrict the content of an employment contract to only the offer and 
acceptance of the job.  Analogizing the Patterson plaintiff’s situation to one in which an 
employer informs an African American applicant that she is hired, but will have to suffer 
racial harassment on the job, Justice Brennan stated, “I see no relevant distinction 
between that case and one in which the employer's different contractual expectations are 
unspoken, but become clear during the course of employment as the black employee is 
subjected to substantially harsher conditions than her white co-workers.”174  The retail 
store analog to Justice Brennan’s hypothetical job offer is a circumstance in which a 
172
 Kennedy, supra note 10, at 306-07.
173 If, however, a retail store were to go beyond merely hanging a sign, and also advertise 
its products and their prices through the mail or by other means, the store might be 
deemed to be inviting offers by customers.  Though not an offer itself, such an invitation 
could be seen as the beginning of a relationship between customer and retailer that 
culminates in the formation of a contract.  Because the store’s invitation to the customer 
starts the contracting process and is necessary for the contract’s eventual formation, a 
retailer’s discrimination against a customer responding to a store’s advertisement would 
then violate § 1981.  See WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, §  27 (3rd 
ed. 1957) (“[I]f goods are advertised for sale at a certain price . . . such an advertisement 
is a mere invitation to enter into a bargain rather than an offer.”).   
174 Patterson, 491 U.S. at 208.
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retailer states to customers, “You can make purchases in my store, but if you are African 
American, Latino, or Asian American, you will have to suffer racial harassment in order 
to do so.”  Like the Patterson majority, the post-1991 courts that have applied § 1981 
narrowly would likely dismiss the claim of a customer presented with such a statement.  
Except in cases like those described in Part III.C, in which the harassment occurs at the 
point of purchase, courts have focused only on the goods sold, and excluded from the 
contract, and therefore also from the statute’s coverage, the quality of the service 
provided.
An alternative view of the content of retail contracts, closer to that of Justice 
Brennan in his Patterson dissent, would include services as well as goods as part of the 
bargain between the store and the customer.  Indeed, one could argue that, because it is 
nearly impossible to make a purchase without interacting with some store personnel,175
the quality of the service provided by that personnel must then be part of the customer’s 
contract with the store.  As Kennedy observes, “It is artificial to separate out those acts 
inimical to shopping from the exchange of tender for goods at the cash register.”176
In contexts other than retail stores, courts have been willing to recognize services, 
as well as goods, as part of the bargain between seller and purchaser.  Professor Anne-
Marie Harris argues that “there is precedent for the proposition that § 1981 proscribes 
race-based harassment . . . when such conduct degrades— but does not completely 
deny— goods or services for customers of color.”177  Courts’ willingness to consider 
service as part of the contract between buyer and seller is most clear in § 1981 claims 
175
 The advent of self-service checkout lanes in supermarkets, for example, might present 
a situation in which a customer could shop without interacting with another human being.
176
 Kennedy, supra note 10, at 322.
177
 Harris, supra note 5, at 47.  
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brought by plaintiffs discriminated against in restaurants.  Though courts have not been 
entirely uniform in their treatment of § 1981 restaurant claims, many have held 
unequivocally that a customer contracts with a restaurant not only for the food purchased, 
but also for the service provided.178
In Charity v. Denny's, Inc.,179 for example, the African American plaintiffs were 
harassed by a waiter, who stated, “Management can't force me to serve niggers.”  The 
court refused to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claim, despite the fact that they were successfully 
able to purchase food, and had thereby made a contract with the restaurant.  The court 
held that “Dining in a restaurant includes being served in an atmosphere which a 
reasonable person would expect in the chosen place.  Courts have recognized that the 
contract formed between a restaurant and a customer does include more than just the food 
ordered.”180  Similarly, in McCaleb v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc.,181 the African American 
plaintiffs ordered pizza to eat inside the restaurant.  The restaurant personnel refused to 
give them plates, napkins, and utensils, and told them to eat out of the pizza boxes.  The 
defendant argued that the plaintiffs had no § 1981 claim because “they were not denied 
178 Interestingly, there is a dispute among courts in § 1981 restaurant cases over the 
proper prima facie case.  Some courts require that a plaintiff make an initial showing that 
he or she was denied a contract right that remained available to similarly situated white
customers.  See, e.g., Givens v. Waffle House, Inc., No. 03-3367, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
5204 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 25, 2006).  Other courts reject this prong of the prima facie case, 
noting that, in the transitory context of a restaurant, a plaintiff may not be able to identify 
a white comparator.  These courts require simply that a § 1981 plaintiff show that he or 
she received service in a “markedly hostile manner” that a reasonable person would find 
“objectively discriminatory.”  Christian, 252 F.3d at 872.  For further discussion of 
pleading requirements in § 1981 retail store cases, see Matt Graves, Purchasing While 
Black: How Courts Condone Discrimination in the Marketplace, 7 MICH. J. RACE & L.
159 (2001).
179
 No. 98-0554, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11462, *4 (D. La. July 27, 1999).
180 Id. at *11-*12.
181
 28 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1046 (D. Ill., 1998).
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the right to contract in that they were provided their pizza and permitted to eat it at the 
restaurant.”182  The court, however, held that the restaurant had failed to provide the 
plaintiffs with the “full value of their purchase” by denying them “the accoutrements that 
are ordinarily provided with a restaurant meal at the Godfrey Pizza Hut.”183  Finally, in 
Perry v. Burger King Corp.,184 the court refused to dismiss the § 1981 claim of an 
African American plaintiff who was refused access to the restaurant bathroom after he 
had purchased, and eaten, his food.  The court held that “plaintiff has stated a claim under 
§ 1981, particularly if Perry is considered to have contracted for food and use of the 
bathroom.”185
In each of these three cases, courts have defined the contract between customer 
and restaurant as encompassing more than the food sold.  They have recognized the 
service provided by restaurant staff, “atmosphere,” “accoutrements,” and use of the 
bathroom as contractual terms protected by § 1981.  Notably, courts accepted these 
additional contractual terms even though Denny’s, Pizza Hut, and Burger King are all 
fast-food, low-cost establishments, not known for their “atmosphere” or high-end service.  
There is no principled reason why service should not also be considered part of the 
contract between a customer and a retail store.  Many of the claims cited in Parts III and 
IV arose out of acts of discrimination in clothing stores, where customers must often 
consult with salespeople in order to try on clothes.  Even in supermarkets and 
convenience stores, customers must often ask for assistance in locating items on the 
shelves.  In addition, retail store customers, just like restaurant patrons, often need to use 
182 Id. at 1047.
183 Id. at 1048.
184
 924 F. Supp. 548, 552 (D.N.Y., 1996).
185 Id. at 552 (emphasis added).
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the bathroom.  Finally, a retail store’s “atmosphere” certainly affects a customer’s 
decision to spend his or her money there or elsewhere. Just as a customer’s movement 
through a store, asking of questions, comparison of prices, and evaluation of the quality 
of goods might be relevant to a contract’s duration, these services might also be 
considered additional parts of a contract’s content.  Courts’ continued insistence on 
excluding services from their consideration of retail contracts, except in situations where 
discriminatory service is tightly tethered to the contractual moment, therefore appears 
without foundation.186
C. Historical Development of Property and Contract Law
Finally, courts’ narrow § 1981 decisions are out of step with the historical 
development of property and contract law.  As explained in Part V, courts have expressed 
great reluctance to transform § 1981 into “a general cause of action for race 
discrimination in all contexts.”187  As a result, they restrict § 1981’s coverage to “core” 
claims— a retailer’s outright refusal to deal or imposition of discriminatory terms and 
conditions at the moment of purchase— and leave plaintiffs with claims of pre-purchase, 
186
 In an analysis that collapses the distinction between a contract’s duration and content, 
the Leach court developed a different way that shoddy service, even after the transaction 
is complete, might trigger § 1981’s protections.  The court viewed bad post-purchase 
service as an indication that the initial contract had to have been made on unequal terms.  
“Though she only called plaintiff a name that any African-American would find deeply 
offensive after he had completed his purchases and was about to exit, that she did so at all 
is clear and direct proof of bias.  It also indicates that the ‘service’ she provided was less 
than that which she might have provided, had plaintiff been Caucasian.”  Leach, 233 F. 
Supp. 2d at 911.  Here, as in Justice Brennan’s Patterson dissent, quality of service 
functions not as part of a contract’s content, but rather as a signal about the nature of the 
contract that was formed earlier, at the time of purchase.  Notably, though the Leach 
court read § 1981 more expansively than many other courts, even this reading relied on a 
“contractual moment” view of contract, the nature of which judges investigate by 
observing post-purchase behavior.  
187 Lewis, 948 F. Supp. at 371-72.
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post-purchase, browser, and potential customer discrimination with no remedy.  In 
essence, these courts’ narrow applications of the statute produce only two rules that 
retailers must follow: allow all customers equal entry and take all customers’ money on 
equal terms at the checkout counter.  However, seen in its historical context, this effort to 
prevent § 1981’s improper expansion in fact imposes quite radical requirements on 
retailers, and contradicts foundational assumptions of private property and freedom of 
contract.  The fact that courts enforce § 1981’s two radical rules without protest, but then 
balk at requiring equal treatment of browsers, potential customers, and pre-purchase and 
post-purchase customers seems quite odd.  
Historically, the right to exclude was seen as “the most central right associated 
with property.”188  In 1885, the Bowlin court expressed a concern that § 1981 might be 
interpreted to make inroads on a retailer’s right to deny entry to any member of the 
public.  Addressing the question of an African American ticket holder’s right of access to 
a skating rink, the Bowlin court rejected any reading of the statute contrary to the rule that 
“neither [the plaintiff], nor any other person, could demand, as a right under the law, that 
the privilege of entering the place be accorded to him.”189  However, just as the Bowlin
court feared, courts today apply § 1981 to eliminate the retailer’s right to exclude.  As the 
Sixth Circuit explained in Watson v. Fraternal Order of Eagles,190 in order to make the 
188
 Singer, supra note 8, at 1456 (“[F]ederal and state statutes substantially limit the right 
of the owner to exclude members of the public on an invidious basis like race … [This 
limitation] cannot usefully be described as a minimal interference with the property rights 
of the owner.”).  
189 Bowlin, 67 Iowa at 540.
190
 915 F.2d 235 (6th Cir. 1990).  Though Watson was decided prior to the Civil Rights 
Act of 1991, because the plaintiffs were asked to leave, it represents a “core” § 1981 case 
that was likely to be successful both before and after the broadening of the statute in 
1991.
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retail contract the statute protects, a customer must first be able to enter a store.  “Were it 
otherwise, commercial establishments could avoid liability merely by refusing minorities 
entrance to the establishment….” 191  Today’s statute, in effect, grants customers a 
privilege to enter, eliminates retailers’ right to exclude, and creates a defense to retailers’ 
claims of trespass.192
The change in courts’ interpretation of § 1981 from Bowlin in 1885 to Watson in 
1990 was not inevitable.  Indeed, courts had at least two colorable arguments for 
continuing to uphold retailers’ claimed right to exclude in the face of § 1981 challenges.  
First, they could have decided that, despite § 1981’s property law implications, the statue 
simply is not a public accommodations law mandating equal access for all.  Here, they 
could rely on the fact that in 1875, a mere five years after § 1981 was reenacted pursuant 
to the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress passed a separate federal public 
accommodations law.  Congress therefore could not have meant § 1981 to be interpreted 
as a public accommodations statute, for the 1875 law would then have been 
duplicative.193
Second, as described in Part V, Congress in 1964 did not include retail stores in 
the coverage of Title II, the public accommodations portion of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964.  Courts could refuse to use § 1981 to make an end-run around Congress’ 
withholding of public accommodations protection to retail stores in 1964.  Despite these 
191 Id. at 243; see also Singer, supra note 8, at 1434 (“Refusal to allow a customer to 
enter the store is equivalent to a refusal to contract; it is a discriminatory refusal to deal.  
The license to enter the store is necessary to make good on the store’s implicit invitation 
to deal.”).    
192 See Hohfeld, supra note 148, at 30 (explaining the “jural opposites” of rights, no-
rights, privileges, and duties).
193
 Singer, supra note 8, at 1427.
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options, today’s courts do interpret § 1981 in retail store contexts as requiring retailers to 
allow customers to enter.  Though this application of the statute destroys “the most 
central right associated with property,”194 courts nevertheless repeatedly uphold the 
claims of plaintiffs who assert core § 1981 claims of retailers’ outright refusals to deal.
Courts’ interpretations of § 1981 make similar inroads on basic notions of 
freedom of contract.  As summarized by Singer, legal thinkers during the classical era 
conceived of the freedom of contract as encompassing not only the freedom to make 
contracts, but also the freedom from forced contracting.195  Singer identifies this principle 
as the root of such doctrines as fraud, duress, and incapacity, all examples of situations in 
which a contracting party’s entry into a contract is not of his or her free will.196  This ban 
on forced contracts also applied to those contracts forced by statute: “Ultimately, the 
courts interpreted the constitutional protection of liberty and property to prohibit 
regulation of market relations by the legislature as well.”197  An additional component of 
the classical approach to contracts was a prohibition on the state’s “regulat[ion] of the 
substantive terms of private relations.”198  Thus, to legal theorists in the classical era, all 
decisions regarding contracts— whether to make them and what content they should 
have— were assigned to the individual contracting parties and were required to be free 
from both private and public coercion.
194 Singer, supra note 8, at 1456.
195 Id. at 1347 (“On the contract side, the courts and scholars began the process of 
developing the ideology of freedom of contract based on the assumption that the terms of 
contractual relationships would be left to the free will of the parties rather than dictated 
by the state.”).
196
 Joseph William Singer, Review Essay: Legal Realism Now, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 467, 
479 (1988).
197 Id. 
198 Id. 
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Seen in this light, even today’s courts’ narrow application of § 1981 to core 
claims of retail store discrimination is contrary to classical notions of freedom of 
contract.  Retailers are forced to deal with all comers, regardless of whether they would 
otherwise choose to make such contracts.  As with the property law dimensions of 
§ 1981, this interpretation of § 1981 is radical, but not inevitable.  Singer relates that 
§ 1981’s language on the right to contract might have been interpreted as requiring only 
the enforcement of contracts made between willing parties.  In this view, customers 
would not be able to force retailers to sell to them, but would be able to enforce a contract 
in court once made.199  This is not the view taken by courts in current § 1981 retail store 
cases.  As illustrated in Causey, courts read as a core § 1981 violation a retailer’s refusal 
“to engage in business with a consumer attempting to contract with the merchant.”200
Section 1981 therefore trumps retailers’ objections to forced contracting, and requires 
unwilling parties to transact with one another.
Given the history of property and contract law, courts’ willingness to overcome 
retailers’ right to exclude and freedom of contract in their applications of § 1981 to 
discrimination in retail stores seems quite radical.  It is hard to understand why, having 
taken such steps, courts would then narrow the statute to exclude claims of discrimination 
by browsers, potential customers, and pre-purchase and post-purchase plaintiffs.  The 
exclusion of these claims seems odd on several dimensions.  
First, if a greater power— or prohibition— generally also includes the lesser, it 
would appear that, once granted the greater right to enter a store, a customer would also 
199
 Singer, supra note 8, at 1427.
200 Causey, 394 F.3d at 289.
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possess the lesser right to consider the merchandise without discrimination.201  Seen from 
the other direction, once granted the greater power to force a retailer to contract, a 
customer could also claim the lesser power to shop before or exit after purchasing free of 
discriminatory harassment.  
Second, it seems unlikely that Congress actually contemplated a § 1981 regime 
that would force retailers to allow customers into their stores and block retailers from 
ejecting them, but then make customers sitting ducks for discrimination at any point 
except purchase.  Could § 1981 really reflect both Congress’ reluctance to legislate the 
“private,” “social” interactions of customers and retailers between entry and purchase and
Congress’ complete disregard for retailers’ right to exclude and freedom of contract?  
Though such a reading of the statute seems implausible, today’s courts apply § 1981 in 
just this way.  
Third, courts’ alarm at the idea of expanding § 1981’s coverage into “all 
contexts,”202 though perhaps reasonable, seems misplaced.  As an initial matter, it is 
unclear why courts have adopted the idea that additional protection of retail customers 
under § 1981 will pave the way to § 1981 regulation of truly private interactions at dinner 
parties or in book clubs, for example.  Retail store plaintiffs are not arguing for coverage 
in “all contexts,” but rather for coverage in all phases of their contractual relationship 
with a retail store.203  Yet even if courts were only alarmed by expanded coverage of 
201 See, e.g., New York State Liquor Authority v. Bellanca, 452 U.S. 714, 717 (1981) 
(“The State’s power to ban the sale of alcoholic beverages entirely includes the lesser 
power to ban the sale of liquor on premises where topless dancing occurs.”).  
202 Lewis, 948 F. Supp. at 371-72.
203
 Judge Selya makes this distinction in Garrett, observing that § 1981 clearly would not 
apply if, “say, if a store manager makes a racially insensitive comment to a fireman who 
responds to a false alarm.”  295 F.3d at 101.     
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browsers, potential customers, and pre- and post-purchase plaintiffs, their alarm would 
still be misplaced.  Seen in light of property and contract law, the proper time for alarm 
was 1866, when Congress first passed the “absolutely revolutionary” § 1981.204 It is 
slightly absurd that courts continue to express alarm at interpreting § 1981 broadly, given 
that even the most “conservative” application of the statute to “core” cases, which courts 
do willingly, requires radical property and contract law decisions.
Once courts recognize that their current, “narrow” applications of § 1981 in fact 
impose quite heavy burdens on retailers at the point of entry and the point of purchase, 
their arbitrary limitations on the statute’s coverage appear unjustifiable.  Courts should 
recognize § 1981 as the radical statute that Senator Trumbull and his colleagues knew 
they were passing in 1866.  They should cease arbitrarily creating a no-man’s-land 
between the point of entry and before and after the point of sale in which acts of 
discrimination are permitted and protected.
Part VII:  Directions for an Improved § 1981 Jurisprudence 
A. Model § 1981 Retail Store Cases: Statutory Interpretation, Duration, and 
Content
Though most courts have interpreted § 1981 since the 1991 amendments very 
narrowly, and have based their decisions on a constricted view of the underlying retail 
contract, some courts and commentators have adopted broader analyses.  These 
expansive interpretations of the post-1991 statute should serve as models for future 
courts’ § 1981 retail store decisions.  These courts have also bothered to analyze the 
contractual relationship between customer and retailer, and have taken a view of the 
204
 Sullivan, supra note 11, at 547 n.38.
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contract’s duration and content that is more nuanced and more loyal to contract law than 
in most § 1981 retail store opinions.  
First, Garrett v. Tandy Corp. shows courts the appropriate way of interpreting the 
scope of the post-1991 statute.  In Garrett, the First Circuit characterized the 1991 
amendments as having expanded the statute’s reach to “situations beyond the four corners 
of a particular contract.”205  The court also explained the history of § 1981, noting that, in 
response to Patterson, “Congress widened the interpretive lens when it enacted the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991.”206  Though the court ultimately decided against the plaintiff’s claim 
on contract law grounds, Judge Selya’s description of the broadened post-1991 statute 
serves as a model.  As in Garrett, courts should consider § 1981’s requirement of 
equality not only in a contract’s making and enforcement, but also in its performance, 
modification, termination, privileges, benefits, terms, and conditions.
Second, courts would benefit from engaging with the law of contracts, as did the 
Garrett court.  However, courts should be wary of adopting wholesale the First Circuit’s 
contract law analysis, for it veers dangerously close to the discredited Patterson practice 
of denying the statue’s coverage to claims of post-purchase discrimination.  Courts 
should instead follow Professor Burton’s and Justice Stevens’ approach, viewing the 
entire interaction between a retailer and those who enter a store as part of a single 
contractual relationship.  
In Leach v. Heyman, the court began to develop a Burton-like view of a retail 
contract’s duration.  The court analyzed the entire “course of [the] dealing” between a 
store clerk and a customer, reading the earlier transaction between clerk and customer in 
205
 295 F.3d at 100.
206 Id. at 98 (emphasis added).
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light of the clerk’s later harassment.  On this basis, the court concluded that the “service” 
the clerk had provided was necessarily “less than that which she might have provided, 
had plaintiff been Caucasian.”207  Just as discrimination while shopping implicates any 
eventual purchase, discrimination after purchase alters a customer’s shopping experience 
in a way that white customers’ experiences are not altered.  Browsers’ rights are similarly 
protected as part of the ongoing contractual interaction between a retailer and those who 
enter his or her store.  Thus, courts should adopt the suggestions of Professor Burton and 
Justice Stevens, follow the example of Leach, and begin to view retail contracts as 
ongoing relationships, rather than a collection of discrete, disaggregated moments. 
Third, in determining the content of retail contracts, courts should look to Allen v. 
U. S. Bancorp,208 as well as courts’ analyses of § 1981 restaurant cases such as 
Charity,209 McCaleb,210 and Perry.211  These courts have properly seen services, in 
addition to the goods or food purchased, as integral parts of retail and restaurant 
contracts.  Indeed, it is near-impossible for a customer to make a purchase without 
interacting in some way with store personnel.  It is hard, then, to justify courts’ 
interpreting § 1981 as permitting store staff to provide shoddy service because of a 
customer’s race or national origin, as long as they ultimately transact with that customer.  
Courts should therefore combine their broadened view of the statute with a broadened 
view of the contract upon which the statute is built, and recognize services as well as 
goods as part of the retail bargain.    
207 Leach, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 911.  
208
 264 F. Supp. 2d 945.
209
 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11462.
210
 28 F. Supp. 2d 1043.
211
 924 F. Supp. 548.
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B. Other Avenues for Relief 
As outlined in Part I, though Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 does not 
protect against discrimination in retail stores, some state and local public 
accommodations laws do include retail stores in their coverage.  For plaintiffs in those 
jurisdictions, state or local law provides an additional avenue for relief.  However, 
because not all state and local laws provide such protection, and because many § 1981 
contracts-based claims fail, plaintiffs have turned elsewhere in search of legal redress.
1. § 1981 Full and Equal Benefits Clause 
In addition to bringing claims under the portion of § 1981 concerned with 
contracts, many plaintiffs who have been discriminated against on the basis of race or 
national origin in retail stores have also brought claims under § 1981’s other major 
clause.  This portion of the statute, known as the full and equal benefits clause, states:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same 
right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be 
parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and 
proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by 
white citizens.212
At first glance, this clause seems to provide another avenue for relief for plaintiffs in 
retail store cases, allowing them to make claims for deprivations of their liberty by store 
security guards or seizure of allegedly stolen goods, for example.  However, there is a 
split among the circuits over whether the full and equal benefits clause protects against 
discrimination by private actors.  In Chapman v. Higbee Co.,213 the Sixth Circuit held en 
banc that an African American plaintiff could state a § 1981 full and equal benefits claim 
212
 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (emphasis added).
213 319 F.3d 825, 828-30 (6th Cir. 2003).
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against a private security officer and store manager who had accused her of shoplifting 
and searched her person and her belongings.  The court focused on the text of § 1981’s 
subsection (c), which was added by Congress as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and 
states, “The rights protected by this section are protected against impairment by 
nongovernmental discrimination and impairment under color of State law.”  According to 
the Sixth Circuit, the language of this subsection permits only one interpretation of the 
statute: that “section 1981 plainly protects against impairment of its equal benefit clause 
by private discrimination.”214
Other circuits have adopted a similar interpretation of the statute, though not
specifically in retail store cases.  In Phillip v. University of Rochester, 215 the Second 
Circuit held that a plaintiff may succeed on a full and equal benefits claim against a 
private actor “without making a traditional state action showing.”  Likewise, the Fifth 
Circuit, even before the 1991 addition of § 1981’s subsection (c), allowed a claim of 
discrimination under the full and equal benefits clause against private citizens.216  Finally, 
though the Tenth Circuit has not spoken on the issue, a Kansas district court has adopted 
this same approach, refusing to read a state action requirement into § 1981’s full and 
equal benefits clause.217
214 Id. at 833.
215
 316 F.3d 291, 292 (2d Cir. 2003) (“Although the phrasing of the equal benefit clause 
does suggest that there must be some nexus between a claim and the state or its activities, 
the state is not the only actor that can deprive an individual of the benefit of laws or 
proceedings for the security of persons or property.”).
216
 Jennings v. Patterson, 488 F.2d 436, 441-42 (5th Cir. 1974).
217 Hester v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1198 (D. Kan. 2005) (“This 
court believes that the Tenth Circuit would hold that state action is not required to state a 
‘full and equal benefit’ claim under section 1981.”).  
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The Eighth Circuit, however, has come to the opposite conclusion, holding that 
plaintiffs must make a showing of state action in order to bring a § 1981 full and equal 
benefits claim.  In Youngblood v. Hy-Vee Food Stores, Inc., the plaintiff brought suit 
under both clauses of § 1981.  The Eighth Circuit allowed the contract-based claim to 
proceed, but upheld dismissal of the plaintiff’s full and equal benefits claim, reasoning 
that, “Because the state is the sole source of the law, it is only the state that can deny the 
full and equal benefit of the law.”218  The Third, Fourth, and D.C. Circuits have followed 
suit, predicting in dictum that full and equal benefit claims against private actors would 
fail.219  In two district court opinions that specifically address race discrimination in retail 
stores, courts have also required state action for a successful § 1981 full and equal 
benefits clause claim.220
In June 2004, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in the Sixth Circuit’s Chapman 
v. Higbee, leaving this issue unresolved.221  At present, though, in the Sixth, Second, 
Fifth, and perhaps Tenth Circuits, the full and equal benefit clause of § 1981 might 
218 Youngblood, 266 F.3d at 855.  
219
 Brown v. Philip Morris, Inc., 250 F.3d 789, 799 (3d Cir. 2001); see also Jones v. 
Poindexter, 903 F.2d 1006, 1010 (4th Cir. 1990); Sheppard v. Dickstein, Shapiro, Morin 
& Oshinsky, 59 F. Supp. 2d 27, 30 n.1 (D.D.C. 1999)  (“Most courts have held that “the 
equal benefits” clause does not extend to private discrimination, and thus, requires state 
action.”).  
220 Lewis, 948 F. Supp. at 371 (“private defendants, as opposed to state actors, cannot 
deprive individuals of the full and equal benefit of all laws”); Sterling, 983 F. Supp. at 
1192 (“However, the parties did not cite and the court could not find any Seventh Circuit 
decisions which hold that the equal benefits clause creates a federal remedy for state law 
tort claims where racial animus is alleged. Nor does the court believe that Congress 
intended such a remedy.”).
221
 542 U.S. 945 (2004).
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provide an additional opportunity for legal redress for plaintiffs who have been 
discriminated against in retail stores.222
2. § 1982 Right to Purchase Personal Property
A second avenue for relief for victims of retailers’ discrimination might be 42 
U.S.C. § 1982, § 1981’s companion statute guaranteeing to “all citizens of the United 
States” the “same right… as is enjoyed by white citizens” to “inherit, purchase, lease, 
sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.”  However, as Professor Kennedy 
observes, “Section 1982 can be applied to lost contractual rights, but it is applied no more 
broadly than Section 1981.”223  Indeed, the plaintiffs who have brought both § 1981 and § 
1982 claims have found their claims succeeding or failing together.  In Shen v. A&P 
Food Stores, the court held that a grocery store’s refusal to serve the plaintiffs violated 
both § 1981 and § 1982.  “[B]ecause of the related origins and language of the two 
sections, they are generally construed in pari materia.  [G]roceries constitute personal 
property and the refusal to sell groceries is a denial of the right to enter into a 
contract.”`224  Likewise, in Morris v. Office Max, Inc., the court dismissed both the 
plaintiff’s § 1981 and § 1982 claims, stating that, “Because of their common origin and 
purpose, § 1981 and § 1982 are generally construed in tandem.”225
222
  For further analysis of § 1981’s full and equal benefits clause, see Simone P. Wilson, 
Retailing Racial Profiling: A Case for the Use of the Full and Equal Benefits Clause of 
Section 1981 in Consumer Racism Claims, 6 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 123 (2004).
223
 Kennedy, supra note 10, at 334.
224 Shen, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21404, at *6.
225 Office Max, 89 F.3d at 413; see also Garrett, 295 F.3d at 103 (“[W] e are confident 
that our reasoning vis-à-vis section 1981 (and, thus, our holding) applies with equal force 
to any claim that the appellant might have under section 1982.”); Hill v. Shell Oil, 78 F. 
Supp. 2d at 777 (“Courts construe § 1982 as coextensive with § 1981.”).
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However, in one case of retail store discrimiation, a court has analyzed claims 
under the two statutes separately.  In Leach v. Hyman, the plaintiff won on his § 1981 
contracts clause claim but lost on his § 1982 claim.226  The court concluded: 
[The plaintiff] cannot make out a claim under § 1982, because he was, 
regardless of Heyman's racial animus, able to purchase the items that he 
had selected.  Nothing that he wanted to buy was withheld from him, or 
only made available to him on terms and conditions that differed from the 
terms and conditions pursuant to which it was available to others.227
Interestingly, the Leach court adopted an unusually broad view of the protections of § 
1981’s contracts clause.  In allowing relief under that statute, however, the court pulled 
back on § 1982, and refused to extend that statute’s coverage to the limits of the coverage 
provided by § 1981.
Because most courts interpret § 1982 as coextensive with § 1981 in retail store 
cases, however, § 1982 fails to provide an additional viable option for plaintiffs who have 
been discriminated against by retailers.  Commentators have suggested few remaining 
strategies for such plaintiffs, among them common law claims, plans for law reform, and 
tactics for consumer empowerment.
3. Common Law Claims, Law Reform, and Consumer Empowerment
To plug the holes created by the failure of many § 1981 and § 1982 claims and the 
scanty coverage of retail stores under state and local public accommodations laws, 
Professors Harris and Kennedy have suggested that plaintiffs bring common law tort 
claims against retailers who discriminate.  Harris argues that a retailer’s detention of a 
shopper “on suspicion of shoplifting” gives rise to claims for false imprisonment and 
226 Leach, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 911.
227 Id.
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perhaps assault and battery.228  She notes, however, that these claims are often doomed 
by laws that permit retailers, in the name of “protect[ing] their goods,” to stop and search 
“‘in a reasonable manner shoppers reasonably suspected of shoplifting.’”229  Kennedy 
adds to the list of available common law claims defamation, negligent training and 
supervision, and negligence.230 Yet she, too, notes problems with plaintiffs’ relying 
solely on common law tort claims, observing that “By suppressing or marginalizing the 
racial aspect of the claims, reliance on state law claims perpetuates the belief that 
profiling customers is an appropriate means of protecting a business.”231
Given the hurdles that plaintiffs face in attempting to use § 1981, § 1982, and the 
common law to obtain a remedy for retailers’ discrimination, it is not surprising that 
commentators have advanced proposals for law reform.  Building on an argument by 
Professor Neil Williams, Harris suggests that courts interpret the common law 
requirement of good faith and fair dealing in contracts as prohibiting discrimination on 
the basis of race.232  Harris points out a flaw in this proposal, however, noting that 
“customers who were merely browsing in the store could arguably be characterized as not 
yet engaged in the formation, performance, enforcement, or termination of a contract.”233
228
 Harris, supra note 5, at 18.
229 Id. at 17-18.  
230
 Kennedy, supra note 10, at 337-38.
231 Id. 
232
 Harris, supra note 5, at 18-19 (“Professor Neil Williams highlights two federal 
opinions from Maine that strongly suggest that race discrimination is inconsistent with 
the common law contractual requirements of good faith and fair dealing.  Professor 
Williams contends that the survival of racial discrimination in contract law advances the 
belief that private discrimination is morally acceptable.  He advocates changes in contract 
law that would ‘reflect contemporary society's disdain for racial discrimination’ by 
prohibiting discrimination in the formation, performance, enforcement, or termination of 
a contract.”). 
233 Id. at 18-19.  
85
Indeed, the texts of § 205 of the Second Restatement of Contracts and §1-203 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code concerning the duty of good faith and fair dealing both refer 
only to the “performance” and “enforcement” of contracts.  If courts interpreting this 
common law requirement adopt a narrow view of the duration and content of retail 
contracts that is similar to the view adopted by most courts in § 1981 contracts clause 
cases, the reach of this proposed common law solution would be quite limited.234  In 
addition, it is possible that retailers might discriminate on the basis of race or national 
origin in good faith.  Such discrimination might be a response by a non-racist retailer to 
the racist beliefs of his or her customers or co-workers.  A plaintiff who is discriminated 
against might therefore lose if he or she only relies on the common law requirement of 
good faith and fair dealing.235
Professor Singer proposes a second way that the common law of property might 
be altered to address the problem of discrimination by retailers.  Singer suggests that, 
under the common law, once owners of private property convert their property into a 
place of public accommodation, they lose their right to exclude.  He explains:
[T]he common-law rule allowing arbitrary exclusion of customers is 
based on an illegitimate conception of private property, which supposes 
that businesses open to the public are indistinguishable from private 
homes. On the contrary, by opening one's property to the public for 
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business purposes, the owner waives a part of her right to exclude, since 
she no longer can claim any legitimate privacy interests.236
This change in the common law— the clear grant of the right to enter retail stores to all 
comers and the elimination of retailers’ right to exclude—  would contribute to the 
elimination of discrimination within retail stores by making clear that retail stores are not 
in any sense “private.”  By removing this baseline assumption within the common law,237
retailers’ could no longer justify discrimination on their premises by reference to their 
status as owners of private property.
A third law reform proposal comes from Amanda G. Main, who advocates that 
Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 be read to include retail stores in its coverage.238
Main argues first that the statute’s list of covered entities should be read as illustrative, 
rather than exhaustive.  She maintains that “[t]here is no appreciable distinction between 
retail stores and other listed places of public accommodation” because retail stores are as 
open to the public and linked to interstate commerce as the listed entities.239  Echoing 
Professor Eskridge’s idea of dynamic statutory interpretation,240 Main also proposes that 
Title II be read in light of later public accommodations statutes.  She points in particular 
to the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), which includes retail stores in its 
coverage.  “In light of Congress' acceptance of a broad list of places of public 
accommodation in the ADA, it is reasonable that Congress would be receptive to a 
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similar list of accommodations in Title II.”241  This change in Title II would extend the 
federal prohibition on race discrimination in places of public accommodation to retail 
stores, and therefore also to those plaintiffs denied protection under § 1981 and other 
laws.
Professor Regina Austin suggests a final, extra-legal way of addressing the 
problem of discrimination on the basis of race or national origin in retail stores.242  Austin 
argues that African Americans should supplement, and perhaps replace, their legal 
challenges to retailers’ discriminatory practices by “[g]enerating collective pro-
production, pro-distribution sentiments among blacks. . . .” 243  She advocates that 
African American shoppers explore “alternative economic arrangements” and “[build] on 
the legacy of a black tradition of mutual aid and communal selfhelp.”244  She offers as an 
example successful “shopping areas, housing projects, and credit unions” owned and run 
by African American churches.245
Austin also issues a challenge, urging African Americans to “embrace the idea 
that economic resistance is something every black can engage in every day.  Blacks must 
take on the mantle of outlaws or bandits, for example, when it comes to passing dollars 
from one black hand to the next as many times as possible before the dollars fall back 
into the grasp of someone else.”246  Here, Professor Austin echoes the now-famous 
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response of Patricia Williams, an African American law professor, to a white store 
clerk’s refusal to let her enter a clothing store: 
I am still struck by the structure of power that drove me into such a 
blizzard of rage. There was almost nothing I could do, short of physically 
intruding upon him, that would humiliate him the way he humiliated me… 
In this weird ontological imbalance, I realized that buying something in 
that store was like bestowing a gift: the gift of my commerce… I was quite 
willing to disenfranchise myself in the heat of my need to revoke the 
flattery of my purchasing power. I was willing to boycott this particular 
store, random white-owned businesses, and anyone who blew bubble gum 
in my face again.247
To Professor Austin, and perhaps also Professor Williams, the law’s options for redress 
for victims of discrimination in retail stores are shamefully insufficient, and shoppers like 
Professor Williams, along with Samaad Bishop and the McCrea family introduced in Part 
I, are left with only the options of boycott and selfhelp.  
C. Conclusion 
This paper has argued that the “right to contract” protected by § 1981 is a process 
rather than a moment.  The statute protects the entire contractual relationship between 
customer and store: entering, browsing or sampling the goods available, interacting with 
store personnel, completing a purchase, and finally exiting the store.  It has also argued 
that stores provide services as well as goods, and § 1981 demands that those services be 
provided equally to all customers, regardless of their race.  Finally, it has argued that § 
1981 cannot be interpreted as mandating equal access, but then permitting unequal 
treatment at all points except the checkout counter.  Congress attempted to broaden § 
1981 in 1991 to correct this very mistake in logic; today’s courts have continued to 
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interpret the statute, and the retail contracts on which the statute pivots, narrowly and 
improperly.
Some might respond to the critiques offered in this paper, and to the alternative 
proposals raised by commentators, by arguing that the status quo is appropriate, and that 
the market, unaided by judicial intervention, will remedy the problem of race 
discrimination by retailers.  Professor Richard Epstein takes this position in his attacks on 
the public accommodations section of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.248  Epstein argues 
that, if the prohibition on discrimination in places of public accommodation were 
repealed, “Is there anyone who thinks that even one major corporation would adopt a 
policy of exclusion on the grounds of race or sex?  Or if it did, that it could profit by that 
strategy in the marketplace?”249  Epstein’s questions depend on two related assumptions: 
that the power of withheld consumer dollars would force discriminatory retailers out of 
business, and that non-discriminating retailers in fact exist as alternatives for African 
American, Latino, and Asian American shoppers.  
Research summarized by Professor Harris contradicts these assumptions by 
revealing the extensive and pervasive nature of race discrimination in today’s market.  
Harris cites Gallup poll results in which thirty percent of African American respondents 
reported that they had experienced discrimination while shopping during the last thirty 
days, and twenty-one percent had been discriminated against while dining out.250  In 
another study by economist Peter Siegelman, survey evidence places “the probability of 
discrimination [against African American customers] in any given restaurant visit or 
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shopping trip [at] roughly one to five percent.”251  Likewise, a study of the retail industry 
by Professors Carol M. Motley of Howard University and Thomas L. Ainscough of the 
University of Wisconsin-Whitewater found that “African Americans wait longer for 
customer service than whites of the same gender.”252  Though surveys and studies are 
certainly open to criticism, these results reveal, at minimum, that race discrimination in 
retail stores is alive and well, and that Epstein’s vision of a market fix is unrealistic and 
flawed.
The continued existence of race and national origin discrimination by retailers and 
the dearth of options for legal redress point to the need for courts to correct their flawed 
§ 1981 contracts clause jurisprudence.  Courts must cease ignoring the 1991 amendments 
to the statute, and interpret it broadly, consistent with canons of statutory interpretation 
and Congress’ goals.  They must correctly analyze a retail contract’s duration, adopting a 
view of a right to contract that is exercised over the course of the entire relationship 
between customer and retailer.  They must also consider service as well as goods as part 
of the bargain between customer and retailer.  Each of these changes would bring the 
claims of browsers, potential customers, those discriminated against before purchasing, 
and those discriminated against afterward within the ambit of the statute.  
If judges continue to apply § 1981 narrowly, and to build their § 1981 analyses on 
a correspondingly narrow vision of a retail contract’s duration and content, they will 
continue to permit race and national origin discrimination by retailers.  Judges will allow 
clear-cut race and national origin discrimination to exist in some protected zone that they 
deem outside the contractual relationship and beyond the statute’s coverage.  “Whites 
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only” signs at stores’ entrances are relegated to our country’s past.  It is wrong for judges 
today to adopt an interpretation of § 1981 that protects the exercise of similar 
discrimination, but within a store’s doors.  In effect, these judges are allowing retailers to 
implement their own “whites only” policies, providing to white customers only a 
harassment- and discrimination-free shopping experience.  In the words of Justice 
Brennan, “One wonders whether [such a judge] still believes that race discrimination—
or, more accurately, race discrimination against non-whites— is still a problem in our 
society, or even remembers that it ever was.”253
253 Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 662 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
